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I. INTRODUCTION 
Education in developing countries is highly sought after. Part of 
its value is as a consumption good: education is valued in its own right and 
is seen as a basic human need. But education also has more materialistic 
value: it is a means to higher income, more stable employment, and better 
working conditions. 
This paper is a survey of the available literature on education 
and income distribution in developing countries. Education may affect the 
distribution of income in a variety of ways: by raising the level of income; 
by changing, for better or worse, the dispersion of income; by opening up new 
opportunities for the children of the poor and thereby serving as a vehicle 
for social mobility and/or, by limiting participation to the children of the 
well-to-do, transmitting intergenerational inequality; by offering greater 
access to favored segments of the population (boys, city-dwellers, certain 
racial groups); by rewarding differently the education received by these 
groups; through public financing, by taxing some more heavily to subsidize the 
education of others; and by interacting with fertility, mortality, health, and 
other aspects of development. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Section II-IV address 
the private benefits of education. Section II is concerned with the private 
benefits of education which accrue as better employment opportunities and 
higher labor incomes. Section III offers a critical review of the literature 
on differing benefits from education for different subgroups in the popula-
tion, with particular attention to the econometric methods used. Section IV 
looks at who (by income class, parental background, region or tribe, sex, and 
other relevant distinctions) receives these private benefits from education 
and why some groups receive more education than others. Section V turns to 
social benefits and examines the relation between education and the incidence 
of poverty, the evidence on social rates of return to education and a critique 
of that evidence, and the association between the distribution of education 
and the inequality of income. Section VI considers the educational system 
as a fiscal program, combines data on the distribution of benefits with data 
on the distribution of costs, and examines the benefits each population 
group receives relative to the costs they pay. Conclusions appear at the end 
of each section. 
This paper is one in a series of studies commissioned by the World 
Bank which evaluate various aspects of the role of education in economic 
development. Any review paper must be selective in the topics covered. In 
striking a balance between depth of coverage of some areas and breadth 
of coverage of all, some relevant areas have of necessity been shortchanged. 
Among the topics not treated in any substantial way here are: direct measures 
of education's role in augmenting the productivity of labor; distributional 
aspects of preschool education: the role of alternative forms of education 
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such as adult education and radio; interrelations between the distribution 
of income and the distribution of health and nutrition; the multidirec-
tional linkages between education, fertility, and income distribution; the 
determinants of school achievement; and examination of the content of educa-
tion. Several of these issues have been recently surveyed elsewhere and the 
small attention given to them in the present paper reflects the division of 
labor among researchers, not the inherent unimportance of these matters. 
II. THE PRIVATE BENEFITS OF EDUCATION 
Any examination of education and income distribution rests on 
the premise that education confers economic benefits on its recipients. 
This section examines the size of the private economic benefits of education. 
Two kinds of private benefits are treated in turn: employment benefits and 
income benefits. The question is then asked in Section III: do the benefits 
of education differ for different groups? 
A. Private Employment Benefits 
In the 1950s and the 1960s it was thought that education clearly 
improved the employment prospects of the people who received it. That percep-
tion changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, partly as a result of the 
study by Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall (1969) detailing the dimensions of the 
problem of educated unemployment in India. Further evidence compiled by 
Turnham (1971) suggested that the relationship is not a simple monotonic one. 
Rather, what he reported was that the highest levels of open unemployment 
are found among people with intermediate education levels in Bogota, Colombia, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Caracas, Venezuela; urban India; urban Ceylon; urban 
Malaysia; and Syria. Evidence from other countries is mixed. Some subsequent 
studies (for example, for Colombia and Sudan) tend to support the pattern of . 
highest unemployment in the intermediate educational categories, whereas 
others (for Kenya, Iran, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua) show 
the rate of unemployment falling with education. The relevant data are 
summarized in Table 1. Note that these data are not standardized by age. 
The causes of unemployment and underemployment among the educated 
have been extensively debated. Among the arguments are: inappropriateness 
of the type of education received; the creation of false hopes by the educa-
tional system; low quality of education; inability of the economy and the 
labor market to create enough jobs that require the skills of the educated; 
and unemployment as part of a process of rational search by the educated for 
the best jobs. I personally am persuaded by the job search position, though 
not to the exclusion of other views; see Fields (1975a) for an elaboration on 
this theme. 
Economists are now well aware of the limitations of unemployment 
measures in developing countries. 1/ Very simply, most people are employed 
according to the standard definition — working at least one hour a week 
1/ For a penetrating examination of measurement issues on employment and 
unemployment, see Bruton (forthcoming). 
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Table 1: 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(in percentages) 
Educational level 
Country 
Argentina 
Ceylon 
Chile 
Colombia 
Dominican Republic 
India 
Iran 
Kenya 
Malaysia 
Nicaragua 
Sudan 
Syria 
Venezuela 
Illiterates 
3.8 
7.1 
12.1 
11.5 
22.4 
1.2 
10.0 
21.0 
10.4 
23.8 
2.0 
4.3 
4.3 
Primary 
4.3 
n.a. 
4.6 
15.3 
17.9 
2.7 
8.1 
21.0 
19.5 
14.0 
2.5 
n.a. 
7.0 
Secondary 
5.7 
11.8 
1.3 
14.9 
9.2 
7.0 
13.0 
13.0 
30.9 
12.2 
5.5 
11.7 
10.2 
HiKher 
3.3 
2.3 
0 
13.2 
n.a. 
2.8 
2.6 
17.0 
15.5 
n.a. 
5.0 
4.4 
2.3 
n.a.: Not available. 
Note: Comparability between countries and educational levels is limited 
because of different definitions and sample populations. 
Source: Psacharopoulos (1978, Table 15). 
- 2 3 8 -
for pay, or f if teen or more hours a week not for pay in a family farm or 
business — and very few are unemployed by the standard definition — 
actively seeking a job but not working in the survey period. The reason why 
i s clear: poor people cannot afford to be openly unemployed for very long. 
The International Labour Organisation mission to Colombia (ILO, 1970) redirected 
our at tent ion from the fact of employment to the kind of employment, to which 
we now turn. 
I t is clear that education raises one's chances of working in a 
superior job. Data on the occupational d is t r ibut ion of the labor force broken 
down by educational attainment are usually found in national population 
censuses. Table 2 gives i l l u s t r a t i v e data for Peru. I t is evident that 
the educated, on average, have bet ter jobs. But we also find much diversity 
within occupations. In other words, a bet ter education is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for entry into the bet ter occupations, but more education does 
help. 
B. Private Income Benefits 
In every country where studies have been done, the evidence is that 
additional education raises income and reduces poverty, often by very substan-
t i a l amounts. Micro-level breakdowns within developing countries show an 
inverse re la t ion between education and poverty. National evidence for Brazil, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, and India i s presented in Table 3. Additional 
evidence for specif ic c i t i e s or regions is widely available elsewhere: 
for ten Latin American c i t i e s in the work of Musgrove (1978); for Lima, Peru, 
in Webb (1974); for Jakarta, Indonesia, in Papanek (1975); for Bogota and 
Cali , Colombia, in Mohan (1979); and in other studies too numerous to mention. 
Looking at incomes more generally, rather than jus t at poverty, 
education appears as a key variable in earnings function studies throughout 
the world. Table 4 shows that the percentage gains in income associated with 
an additional year of education are estimated to range between 3.6 percent and 
17.2 percent, with an average of 11.2. 
The importance of education is also revealed in decomposition 
s tudies , which are surveyed in Fields (1979b). Education i s the single most 
important determinant of income. That i s , if you sought to determine an 
individual 's income and could ask only one question, you would do best to 
ascertain how much education the individual in question had received. 
One thing worth noting is that these are average figures. Some 
groups in these countries may benefit more than others from education. In 
par t i cu la r , i t is thought that the children of the well-to-do may benefit more 
from education than do the children of the poor. The evidence on this point 
i s reviewed below in Section I I I . 
Why education resul ts in higher income is a matter of some debate. 1/ 
The dominant school of thought, and one which clearly contains a strong element 
of t ruth , i s the human capi ta l view, which holds that education creates addi-
t ional productive sk i l l s and knowledge embodied in people. The higher income 
received by better-educated workers is seen as a payment to the superior 
productivity they have gained through education. But though the evidence from 
1/ Blaugh (1973) terms this the "puzzling economic value of education." 
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Table 2: 
EMPLOYED POPULATION BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AND 
BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ATTAINED, PERU, 1972 
(in percentages) 
Educational level attained 
Without Some or completed All educational 
Occupation Schooling Primary Secondary Higher levels 
Professional, 
technical, 
executive, and 
managerial 
C le r i ca l 
Sales 
Service 
Agr icu l tu ra l 
Other nonag r i cu l t u r a l 
Not spec i f ied 
Total 
0 . 4 
0 . 3 
4 . 5 
6.0 
74.5 
11.8 
2 .5 
100.0 
2 . 1 
1.9 
8.8 
9 .8 
47.3 
27.2 
2 .9 
100.0 
16.9 
20.0 
13.3 
8.6 
8.7 
28.2 
4 . 3 
100.0 
63.7 
14.5 
6 .2 
4 . 3 
3 .2 
5.0 
3 . 1 
100.0 
8 .2 
6.0 
8 .7 
8 .5 
42.3 
23.2 
3 . 1 
100.0 
Source; Oficina Naclonal de Estadisticas y Censos, VII Censo Nacional de 
Poblacion. 1972 (Lima, Peru, 1974). 
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Table 3: 
INCIDENCE OF POVERTY AMONG HOUSEHOLDS AT DIFFERENT 
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS, SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Country 
and Source 
B r a z i l , 1960 
(Source: F lsh low 1972) 
Malays ia , 1970 
(Source: Anand 1977) 
Taiwan, 1972 
(Source: Kuo 1975) 
Thai land , 1968-69 
(Source: Meesook 1975] 
I n d i a , 1964-65 
(Sources : Bardhan 1974 
Educat ion of head 
of household 
None 
Primary 
Lower secondary 
Upper secondary 
U n i v e r s i t y 
Education of head 
of household 
None 
Some primary 
Completed primary 
Lower secondary 
Some upper secondary 
Poor 
F a m i l i e s 
( p e r c e n t ) 
64 
35 
1 
0 
0 
Inc idence 
of poverty 
(percent ) 
49 .0 
3 9 . 1 
32 .8 
11 .7 
5 . 2 
C e r t i f i c a t e V or h i g h e r 2 . 1 
Educat ion of head 
of household 
I l l i t e r a t e 
Primary 
Secondary 
C o l l e g e 
Educat ion of head 
of household 
None 
PI-MS 2 
MS3-MS4 
MS 5+ 
Educat ion of head 
of household 
I l l i t e r a t e 
Da Costa 1971) Primary 
Above primary, 
Poor 
groups 
(percent ) 
81 .0 
1 4 . 1 
0 
4 . 9 
I n c i d e n c e 
of poverty 
(percent ] 
2 1 . 4 
2 6 . 1 
1 . 1 
1 .8 
A l l 
Other 
( p e r c e n t ) 
35 
55 
5 
2 
2 
A l l 
groups 
( p e r c e n t ) 
1 2 . 3 
5 1 . 4 
2 9 . 1 
7 .2 
Average d i s p o s a b l e income 
per he 
below m a t r i c u l a t i o n 
M a t r i c u l a t i o n and 
i n t e r m e d i a t e 
P r o f . / t e c h . c e r t i f i c a t e 
C o l l e g e graduate , 
a r t s and s c i e n c e s 
P r o f . / T e c h . degree 
Pos tgraduate 
jusehold (Rs . ) 
1 ,186 
1 ,489 
2 , 3 5 8 
2 ,803 
2 ,630 
5 , 4 3 2 
6 ,776 
L2.015 
Source: Fields (1980, Table V.2) 
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Table 4: 
INCOME AND SCHOOLING IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Percentage change in 
income associated with 
an additional year of 
schooling 
Proportion of 
variance in 
income explained 
by included variables Source 
la 
ia 
ia 
sia 
CO 
n 
nd 
am 
17.2 
16.1 
16.9 
11.4 
12.5 
5.7 
4.8 
5.3 
15.0 
15.8 
6.0 
3.6 
16.8 
.50 
.57 
.32 
.32 
.44 
.81 a/ 
.42 
.80 a/ 
.73 
.44 
.55 
.51 
.16 
Velloso (1975) 
Fields (1976) 
Fields and Schultz (1977) 
Rugler et_al. (1977) 
Demetriades and 
Psacharopoulos (1979) 
Psacharopoulos and 
Williams (1973) 
Thais and Carnoy (1972) 
Hoerr (1973) 
Carnoy (1967) 
Psacharopoulos (1977) 
Gannicott (1972) 
Blaug (1974) 
Stroup and Hargrove (1969) 
sed grouped data, hence the high R • 
The table shows the c o e f f f i c i e n t of earnings on years of school ing , 
in semi- logarithmic earnings funct ions . The c o e f f i c i e n t s are not 
s t r i c t l y comparable because of the d i f f erent independent var iab le s 
used i n each study. 
e: Psacharopoulos (1978, Table 12) . 
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literally hundreds of earnings function studies in dozens of countries is 
consistent with the human capital interpretation (Blaug 1978), that same 
evidence is also consistent with other explanations. Blaug (1973) calls thes 
the "sociological" and "psychological" explanations, by which he means that 
education inculcates students with certain socially acceptable values (the 
"sociological" explanation), and that education acts as a screening device to 
select the best qualified workers for the job (the "psychological" explana-
tion). Although each of these explanations is undoubtedly accurate to some 
degree, their relative explanatory value has not been determined and is even 
thought by some to be undeterminable. 
One should note that the evidence reviewed above refers to the 
private benefits of education. Coefficients of education in earnings func-
tions are sometimes interpreted as private rates of return, that is, a coeffi 
cient of X percent is taken to mean that "education raises the present value 
of expected lifetime income by X percent. This will only be correct if there 
are no precisely accurate (private) costs of education other than economies 
forgone while in school or if direct costs and unmeasured earnings while 
in school cancel each other out. 
Data on the earnings received by individuals with different levels 
of educational attainment frequently are used to compute not private but 
social rates of return. This literature is reviewed in Section V. 
C. Conclusions on the Private Benefits of Education 
By now, it has been thoroughly documented that in some but not 
all developing countries better-educated workers have lower unemployment rat 
than do less-educated workers; that the better-educated tend to be employed 
more frequently in the superior occupations; and that they tend to earn highe 
incomes while working. Subsequent sections address whether the benefits 
differ for various population groups and identify who the beneficiaries 
are. 
III. DIFFERENT BENEFITS OF EDUCATION FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS 
Not everyone in developing countries benefits equally from educa-
tion. At any given educational level, some individuals receive larger income 
and other benefits than do others. The empirical evidence is presented and 
examined critically below. 
A. Empirical Evidence 
Differences in returns to education are thought to arise in many 
dimensions: by sex, race or tribe, region, rural or urban location, stratum 
of the labor market in which the individual is employed, occupation, industry 
socioeconomic background, and whether or not the individual is poor. Dif-
ferent incomes received by workers grouped according to any or all of these 
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dimensions would constitute "labor market segmentation" according to most 
[definitions, none of which I find particularly satisfactory. _1/ 
The literature offers many studies of whether different groups in 
the labor force receive different rewards from education. The methodologies 
followed in these studies are of two general types, corresponding to two 
related but distinct questions. The first of these is: are some individuals 
paid more in the labor market than would be predicted from their education and 
skills, depending on their sex, race, or occupation? The second is: do the 
earnings functions (in general) and the estimated gains from more education 
(in particular differ for various groups depending on their sex or race or 
occupation? Research into the first question looks for income differences in 
the earnings (or income-generating) functions themselves. In research into 
the second question the labor force is stratified into segments separate 
earnings-function regressions are new within each stratum, and the regression 
coefficients in each stratum are then compared. 
1. Shift Variables in a Single-Equation Earnings Function 
In the first approach, the supposed segmentation variable is included in 
a multiple regression as a shift variable in an earnings function. An example 
is the work of Bourguignon (1979). He uses the following variables: 
Y = income, 
EDUC = years of schooling, 
EXP = labor market experience, 
EXPSQ = labor market experience squared, 
WORKTIME - hours per week, 
M - dummy variable for modern sector employment. 
In a recent paper (Fields 1979a), I considered a number of alternative 
definitions of labor market segmentation. A commonly-used conceptualiza-
tion is that stated by Selowsky (1979a, p. 22): "wage differences (for 
labor of equal skill or education) associated to particular occupation or 
sector of employment." Virtually the same definitions have been used in 
studies of developing countries by Mazumdar and Ahmed (1977), Souza and 
Tokman (1977), Altimir and Pinera (1977), and Bourguignon (1979), among 
others. I have problems with these definitions because they fail to 
consider why the worker is in one group rather than another. Others 
criticize these definitions for their failure to consider compensating (or 
equalizing) differences in unmeasured job attributes. As anyone familiar 
with utility theory knows, appeals to unmeasured variables explain 
everything, and hence nothing. 
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His regression evidence (p. 66, reg. 1. a) for males in Bogota i s : 
Y - 5.266 + .145 EDUC + .074 EXP - .001 EXPSQ + .196 WORKTIME 
(.004) (.003) (.000) (.040) 
2 
+ .123 M, R = .316, n = 3,713. 
(.021) 
All regression coefficients are s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant at the 1 percent 
l eve l . Bourguignon in te rpre t s the significance of the modern-traditional 
sector employment variable as evidence of a degree of dualism in the Bogota 
labor market. 
This kind of approach— introducing sh i f t variables into single-
equation multiple regression models and observing whether people with the 
same measured education, experience, and other character is t ics receive 
different incomes in the labor market depending upon the i r own characteristics 
or upon charac ter is t ics of the i r employment — has been used in many studies 
of developing countries. Most shif t variables have proven to be s ta t is t ical ly 
s igni f icant . The resu l t s of some of the studies using th is approach are 
presented in Table 5. 
Two classes of variables have generally been found not to be sig-
nif icant in shif t ing the earnings function. One kind of variable pertains to 
the worker's socioeconomic background. We have studies by Kugler (1975) and 
Fields (1976) for Colombia, by Pang and Liu (1975) for Singapore, Carnoy (1967 
for Mexico, Blaug (1974) for Thailand, and Mazumdar (1979) for Malaysia — 
most of which show the unimportance of paren ts ' income, occupation, or educa-
t ion in determining the incomes of thei r sons or daughters in the labor market 
(see Table 6) . We should note, however, that i t i s only the direct effect of 
parental background that i s shown to be ins ignif icant . In nearly a l l studies 
that have allowed for indirect effects of parental background on the socio-
economic s ta tus of the children, a clear linkage i s shown between the socio-
economic s ta tus of the parents , the educational attainment of their children, 
and the chi ldren 's subsequent economic posi t ion . (See Section IV.) This 
evidence should be interpreted as a hopeful sign tha t , in many socie t ies , the 
children of the poor — if they do receive education — wi l l apparently not be 
discriminated against in the labor market when i t comes time for them to seek 
jobs commensurate with the educational levels they have reached. 
Another variable that usually i s found to be insignificant in the 
studies of incomes and earnings in developing countries is the individual 's 
migrant s t a t u s . The relevant l i t e r a t u r e i s reviewed in Yap (1977) and Todaro 
(1976); a more recent examination, perhaps the most thorough for a developing 
country, i s the work of Ribe (1979) for Colombia. These studies report that 
migrants ' earnings are v i r tua l ly ident ica l with those of natives at destina-
t ion . Put d i f ferent ly , the evidence i s that migrants quickly acquire economic 
comparability with l ifelong res idents . The implication for educational 
planning i s that if a person i s educated in one area and then moves elsewhere, 
tha t person i s apt to find the labor market receptive to him and wi l l there-
fore be able to put his education to effective use. 
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Table 5: 
VARIABLES EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS, 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
ource Country 
ny studies too numerous to list 
angoni (1975) Brazil 
ourguignon (1979) Colombia 
ields (1978a) 
usgrove (1978) 
usgrove (1978) 
Colombia 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
zumdar and Ahmed (1977) Malays ia 
"usgrove (1978) Peru 
ight and Sabot (1977) Tanzania 
laug (1974) Thai land 
troup and Hargrove (1969) Vietnam 
Shi f t v a r i a b l e s 
Sex 
Status, sector 
Mode rn-t radi tional 
sector 
Industry 
Occupation 
Occupation 
Firm size, sector 
Occupation 
Occupation 
Firm size, 
occupation 
Occupation 
omas (1976) Yugoslavia Industry, 
occupation 
Higher coefficient for: 
Males 
Employers, manufactur ing 
Modern s e c t o r 
Tobacco, rubber 
Manager ia l 
Professional 
100+ employees, 
fo re ign s e c t o r 
Professional 
Supervisory employees 
Large f i r m s , 
e x e c u t i v e s 
Professional and 
clerical 
Medium capital intensity, 
general management 
te: The table shows shift variables in single-equation earnings functions. 
^ttm 
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Table 6: 
EFFECTS OF FAMILY BACKGROUND VARIABLES ON EARNINGS, 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Statistically 
Source 
Kugler 
(1975) 
F i e l d s 
(1976) 
Mazumdar 
(1979) 
Carnoy 
(1967) 
Pang and 
Liu 
(1975) 
Blaug 
(1974) 
Country 
Colombia 
Colombia 
Malays ia 
Mexico 
Singapore 
Thai land 
s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s 
Logari thm of 
f a t h e r ' s income 
Mother ' s 
educa t ion 
None 
F a t h e r ' s 
occupa t ion 
Proxy for p a r e n t s ' 
income, m o t h e r ' s 
educa t ion 
P a r e n t s ' e d u c a t i o n , 
f a t h e r ' s occupat ion 
( s a l e s or e x e c u t i v e ) 
Nonsignificant 
variables 
Parents' occu-
pation and 
education 
Father's occu-
pation and 
education 
Father's occu-
pation and 
education 
Father's occu-
pation and 
education 
Other father's 
occupations 
Reasons for overall 
unimportance a/ 
" • J ••"'•• .. ML- . * » '-' ni>.. 
Low explanatory power 
compared with other 
sonal characteristi 
As above 
Statistically 
insignificant 
b/ 
c/ 
Small coefficients a" 
low explanatory pove 
compared with other* 
personal character! 
a_/ The reasons given for overall unimportance of the socioeconomic variables 
are those expressed by the authors themselves in their studies. 
b_/ Carnoy (1967) computed private rates of return to education. The magnitude 
of these rates is not associated in any direction with the occupation of 
the fathers. 
c_/ Pang Liu (1975) find that the proxy variable for parents' income accounts for 
more than 11 percent of the observed variance in earnings. 
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2. Earnings Functions on Stra t i f ied Subsamples 
The second methodological approach to determining if "comparable" 
workers receive different rewards from the labor market is to run earnings 
functions on s t r a t i f i e d subsamples of the labor force; sometimes, in place 
of multiple regression, these returns to education are estimated using simple 
cross-tabulations. These are several examples of such s tudies ; the i r resul t s 
are summarized in Table 7. Despite the seeming sophist icat ion of many of 
these studies (in that they look for a variety of effects of education and 
other variables on the incomes of different population subgroups, and t e s t for 
these effects using the Chow t e s t or other sophisticated econometric methods), 
i t nonetheless turns out that many of them are methodologically deficient . 
These methodological issues are discussed in the following subsection. 
B. Methodological Issues 
As a whole, the empirical studies have taken l i t t l e care with the 
nature of the segmenting variables and the s t ructure of the labor market that 
produces differences between groups. Most researchers have not concerned 
themselves with whether the groups are defined according to unalterable 
personal character is t ics such as sex; choice variables such as place of 
residence; limited opportunity sets (for example, work in modern vs . t r a d i -
tional sector employment); or income i t s e l f . Yet, as I shal l now show, how 
the segmenting groups are defined crucially affects the in terpreta t ion of both 
dummy variable and segmented earnings function regressions. 1/ 
1. A Simple Structural Model of Income Determination 
In the pursuit of higher income, there are some exogenous factor 
that an individual has no power to change. Without question, these include 
sex, age, race, and family background; somewhat less cer ta inly , but usually 
treated as unalterable, are an individual 's education, migrant s t a tus , and 
religion. Other income-determining factors are endogenous to the income-
determination process. These include occupation; industry of employment; 
characteristics of the occupation, industry or firm; and place of work. 
What these have in common i s that workers presumably maximize over these 
variables by choosing subject to constraints , that occupation, industry, 
firm or workplace which pays best . 
1/ For further deta i ls of these arguments, see Fields (1979a). 
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Table 7; 
Author 
VARIABLES EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS 
IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
"Segmentation" is 
Country reported according to; Higher earnings for: 
Many s t u d i e s too 
numerous to l i s t 
Langonl (1975) B r a z i l 
J a l l a d e (1977) B r a z i l 
Corbo (1974) Chi le 
Kugler (1977) Colombia 
Kugler e t a l . ( 1979 ) Colombia 
Musgrove (1978) Colombia 
F i e ld s (1978a) Colombia 
Bourguignon (1979) Colombia 
Sex 
Occupation, s e c t o r 
Socioeconomic group 
Indus t ry - f i rm s i z e 
Poor v s . non-poor 
Modern v s . nonmodern, 
t r a d i t i o n a l v s . 
marginal s e c t o r 
City of r e s idence 
Urban v s . r u r a l , 
employer v s . employee 
Modern vs. traditional 
sector 
Males 
Employers, t e r t i a r y 
s e c t o r workers 
Males, non-farm a c t i v i t y 
Chemical and pharmaceutical 
i n d u s t r y , 100 or more 
employees 
Nonpoor 
Modern, marginal 
Bogota workers 
Urban workers , 
employers 
Modern s e c t o r workers 
Mohan (1979) 
Mazumdar (1978) 
Psacharopoulos 
and Williams (1973) 
Mazumdar (1979) 
Webb (1974) 
Pang and Liu 
(1975) 
Knight and Sabot 
(1977) 
Chiswick (1977) 
Stroup and 
Hargrove (1969) 
Colombia 
India (Bombay) 
Iran 
Malaysia 
Peru 
Singapore 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Neighborhood within 
Bogota 
Three s e c t o r s : c a s u a l , 
s m a l l - s c a l e , fac tory 
Three employee c a t e g o -
r i e s : permanent, 
c o n t r a c t , and new 
Publ ic v s . p r i v a t e , 
w h i t e - c o l l a r v s . b l u e -
c o l l a r , p l an t s i z e , 
race (2 groups) 
Self-employed v s . 
fac tory workers 
Primary v s . secondary 
s e c t o r 
Rac ia l groups 
Employees v s . 
self-employed 
Farmers v s . non-
farmers , occupat ion 
Workers in h igher income 
neighborhoods 
Noncasual s e c t o r 
workers 
Contract employees 
Publ ic employees, whi te-
c o l l a r , larger firm 
s i z e , Malays 
Self-employed 
Primary sec to r workers 
Non-African Workers 
Employees 
Nonfarmers, sales and 
service workers 
Thomas (1976) Yugoslavia Region Slovenia 
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A simple structural model of the relationship between these sets 
of variables appears in the following figure: 
Figure 1; 
A SIMPLE STRUCTURAL MODEL OF INCOME DETERMINATION 
Exogenous 
income -
determining 
variables 
Endogenous 
income -
• Income I 
In th is model, the exogenous variables affect income both d i rec t ly , by 
influencing one's income within occupational or indus t r i a l groupings, and 
indirectly by influencing which occupation or industry one i s in . 
We may now ask: having recognized th i s economic s t ruc ture , what 
difference does i t make to the econometric tes t ing of the questions posed 
above? We consider f i r s t the use of sh i f t variables in a single-equation 
earnings function and then earnings functions run on s t r a t i f i e d subsamples. 
2. Shift Variables in a Single-Equation Earnings Function 
When one introduces shi f t variables into earnings functions, the 
issue i s whether some individuals are paid more (or less) in the labor market 
than would be predicted from the i r education and s k i l l s alone, and whether 
these differencs are associated with sex, race, or occupation. The eco-
nometric procedure used to address these issues i s to introduce potent ia l 
explanatory variables as addit ional regressors and estimate models of the 
form: 
where 
Y = a + 6 EXOG + y ENDOG + e , 
Y = income (or i t s logarithm), 
EXOG = exogenous income-determining fac to r ( s ) , 
ENDOG = endogenous income-determining fac to r ( s ) , 
a , (J , Y • parameters, and 
e = error term. 
-250-
How good is the estimated earnings function? Econometric theory offers a clear 
answer: all regression coefficients — not only those of the endogenous factors 
such as occupation but also those of exogenous factors such as education — are 
biased, because of the correlation between the endogenous variables and the 
error term. 1/ 
What is the direction of the bias? Suppose there were three income-
determining factors: education (exogenous), sex (exogenous), and occupation 
(endogenous). The effect of ignoring the endogeneity of occupation is 
to attribute mistakenly to occupation a larger independent effect on income 
than is justified, for some part of the apparent effect is really derived 
from the intercorrelation among the explanatory variables and the error term. 
That is, if OLS (ordinary least squares) is used to estimate an earnings 
function like that given above, simultaneous equations bias causes one to 
overstate the independent contributions of occupation in explaining income 
and understate the independent contributions of education and sex. Nearly 
all investigators, myself included, have at one time or another failed to 
consider these biases in empirical work. 
The usual remedy is to estimate a reduced form of the model illus-
trated in Figure 1. Reduced-form estimation is helpful up to a point. It is 
formally correct and yields unbiased estimates of the total effects of educa-
tion, sex, and other exogenous income-determining factors on income. In 
particular, if we wish to know whether some individuals are paid more (or 
less) in the labor market than would be predicted from their education and 
skills, depending on their sex, race, or family background, reduced-form 
estimation is an appropriate method. 2/ 
These reduced-form estimates may be compared with those obtained 
when occupation and other endogenous income-determining factors are included 
in the usual way using OLS. Estimates derived in these two ways differ in 
empirical studies, but not by much. This means that the effects of education 
and other exogenous income-determining factors are measured reasonably well by 
established methods. 
What about the effects of occupation and other endogenous income-
determining factors? Reduced form estimation, by definition, does not even 
try to estimate the effects of these endogenous factors. It therefore offers 
no information on the extent to which different occupational or industrial 
groups in the population receive different benefits from education. Thus, 
the importance of the biases in the estimated effects of endogenous income-
determining factors remains unknown. 
In summary, those earnings functions estimated by OLS which include 
shift variables to allow for different rewards from education for workers 
who differ in sex, race or other exogenous factors are suitable provided 
the earnings function model is otherwise well specified. However, those 
which include shift variables to allow for different rewards from education 
1/ I shall spare the reader the details of the argument; see Fields (1979a) 
for more on this. 
2/ Provided, of course, that the income-determination model is otherwise 
well specified. 
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for workers in different occupations or industr ies suffer from simultaneous 
equations bias , which affects the estimates of a l l included var iables . The 
size of the biases affecting the estimated effects of exogenous income-
determining factors i s unknown, but inferences from such estimates ought to be 
drawn with care. Because the available reviews in the l i t e r a t u r e f a i l to 
distinguish between re la t ively appropriate and re la t ive ly inappropriate 
studies, they cannot be rel ied on to resolve these issues . 
We turn now to the question of separate earnings functions for 
different groups. 
3. Earnings Functions on Stra t i f ied Subsamples 
Earnings functions have been run separately for different groups 
in many developing countries (see Table 7). When is i t valid to infer that 
some groups benefit more than others from education, or to conclude more 
generally that some groups' earnings functions differ s ignif icant ly and 
meaningfully from those of others? The s t ruc tura l model of income determina-
tion shown in Figure 1 suggests that we can dist inguish three kinds of group-
ings: according to exogenous income-determining var iables , endogenous income-
determining var iables , or income i t s e l f . The val id i ty of earnings function 
estimates for s t r a t i f i ed subsamples depends on which kind of grouping i s used. 
They are presented in turn. 
S t ra t i f ica t ion by Exogenous Income-Determining Factors. When a sample 
of workers is s t r a t i f i ed according to sex, race, or other exogenous charac te r i s t i cs , 
the question i s : What function determines the income expected by a representative 
worker of sex or race? The pr incipal conclusion about s t r a t i f i e d earnings functions 
when workers are grouped by exogenous income-determining factors i s that valid 
results are obtained when the labor force i s segmented in th i s way. An undistorted 
estimate of the returns to education i s obtained for members of each group. 
Actually, a regression f i t t ed to the whole sample may resul t 
in a biased estimate of the effect of an extra year of education on income 
ror a l l s t r a t a . For example, if men and women each earn 10 percent higher 
incomes for each extra year of education, but men with any given level of 
ducation are paid more than women, then the effect of education on income 
estimated for a sample of both men and women might appear to be 20 percent 
or 5 percent when in fact everybody gets 10 percent. 1/ (See Figure 2.) 
To sum up, when (i) different groups in the labor force receive 
^different incomes, and ( i i ) these incomes are generated by different under-
lying earnings functions, and ( i i i ) these groupings are based on an exogenous 
characterist ic , then the sample should be s t r a t i f i ed and separate earnings 
functions run for each segment, since not segmenting wi l l typically produce a 
Mased estimate of the effect of education on income. 
1/ The magnitude and sign of such bias depends on how the different groups 
are distr ibuted with respect to the explanatory variable (education 
in the example). The bias w i l l be posit ive whenever the higher-paid 
group (males) also has, on average, a higher level of educational a t t a i n -
ment, and negative otherwise, as shown in Cases A and B of Figure 2, 
respectively. 
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Stra t i f ica t ion by Endogenous Income-Determining Factors. In severa' 
of the studies of developing countries cited in Table 7, earnings functions ' 
have been run and the s tructures compared for workers in various groupings by 
endogenous factors such as occupation, industry, firm s i ze , and work place. 
How meaningful are within-group regressions l ike these? Before answering, 
we must establ ish carefully the objective of the exercise, since ambiguity 
abounds• 
The purpose of s t ra t i fy ing a sample of workers according to occupa-
t ion, industry, or other charac te r i s t i cs , i s to establ ish what function detet 
mines the income expected by a worker with cha rac te r i s t i c s . This question in 
th is par t icu la r form i s too vague to be useful and has led to much confusion 
in the l i t e r a t u r e . Problems ar i se in two respects . For one thing, the 
question f a i l s to specify when the worker i s in group i . Is he/she in that 
group at the beginning of working l i f e , at the time of the survey, or through 
out? And second, once we recognize that workers are heterogeneous, we must 
ask: to which worker i s the earnings function supposed to apply? To the 
representative worker in that group? To the representative worker in the 
population as a whole? Or to somebody else? More specif ic i ty i s needed. 
I suggest the following as an in teres t ing question, perhaps the 
most in teres t ing one, pertaining to intergroup differences in earnings func-
t ions: what function determines the income expected by a representative 
worker entering the labor force in group i ? The standard method of answer-
ing th i s question i s to divide the sample according to current occupation 
or industry and to run separate earnings functions within each such repre-
sentative group. 
How valid i s th is procedure? The answer has three pa r t s . First , 
when the labor force i s grouped according to endogenous income-determining 
factors , if there i s np_ mobility between groups, and if the labor force is 
homogeneous with respect to omitted var iables , then intragroup regressions 
provide valid estimates of the effect of education on income in each occupa- . 
t ion . The reason why intragroup estimates are valid under the stated assump-
tions is that the labor market i s completely segmented, so that otherwise 
ident ica l workers receive different wages depending solely upon the segment 
of the labor market in which they are f i r s t employed, with no opportunity to 
move from the poorer to the be t te r segment. If the stated assumptions do not 
hold, however, the intragroup regressions are not va l id . 
Hence, and second, when the labor force is grouped according to 
endogenous income-determining factors , if workers move within groups, then 
intragroup regressions provide invalid estimates of the effect of education 
on income in each occupation. The simple in tu i t ive explanation is that any ", 
degree of mobility between the segments means that some of those who star t 
in group i move up to group j , and th i s mobility i s ignored in within-group 
regressions. The resul t i s sample se lec t iv i ty b ias : looking only at the 
incomes of those individuals who end up in group i underestimates the income 
expected by individuals who s tar ted out in that group. 
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Figure 2: 
BIAS FROM OMITTING OR FAILING TO STRATIFY BY AN 
EXOGENOUS INCOME-DETERMINING VARIABLE 
ase A: 
igher-paid 
oup has 
igher average 
ducat ion 
Y 
(Income) Fitted regression line, men only 
Fitted regression line, whole sample 
Fitted regression line, women only 
-X (Education) 
se B: 
gher-paid 
oup has 
ower average 
du cation 
Y 
(Income) Fitted regression line, 
men only 
•Fitted regression line, 
whole sample 
Fitted regression line, 
women only 
X (Education) 
-254-
Third, when the labor force i s grouped according to endogenous 
income-determining fac tors , if the labor force is heterogeneous with respect 
to omitted var iables , and if the effects of these unmeasured variables are 
ignored, then intragroup regressions provide invalid estimates of the effect 
of education on income. Take ab i l i ty as an unmeasured var iable . I t is 
well-known that to ignore ab i l i t y in earnings functions, in the absence of 
ab i l i ty measures, imparts an upward bias to the estimated coefficients of 
variables such as education, which are correlated with ab i l i t y . This is 
because part of the estimated return at t r ibuted to education is in fact a 
return to superior a b i l i t y . What happens if we s t r a t i fy the sample and run 
separate earnings functions within each stratum, ignoring the unmeasured 
ab i l i ty? The l ikely effect i s to reduce the apparent contribution of educa-
t ion in determining earnings in the lower s t r a t a , even, in extreme cases, 
producing a seeming negative re la t ion between education and earnings. One 
might tend to conclude from such evidence that education fa i l s to raise inco 
for workers in the lower earnings s t r a t a . This inference may be unfounded: 
those individuals s t i l l in the lower s t r a t a , despite a high level of educa-
t ion , are l ikely to have low ab i l i ty — otherwise, they would probably have ] 
been able to move to higher s t r a t a . Incomes are low among highly educated 
people working in the lower labor-force s t r a t a because the i r low (unmea-
sured) ab i l i t y offsets the i r high (measured) education. Since this unmeasur" 
var iable , a b i l i t y , remains unmeasured, however, we cannot detect the cause o 
the low income and so erroneously conclude that education does not pay off 
among th i s group of workers. \J 
To sum up the discussion on s t r a t i f i c a t i on by endogenous income-
determining factors , these procedures yield valid resu l t s only under strong 
assumptions that do not hold. In each case, the problem i s a form of selec-
t i v i t y bias brought about by truncation the sample: education tends to 
r a i se people's incomes by allowing them to move out of lower occupational or 
indus t r ia l categories into higher ones, and th i s effect is missed when income 
functions are estimated within an occupation. The resul t is that the effect 
of education on income may be substant ial ly understated in the segmented 
earnings functions. Figure 3 i l l u s t r a t e s th is for a s i tua t ion in which the 
better-educated individuals tend to be employed as highly paid office workers 
and the more poorly educated individuals tend to be lower-paid factory worke 
1/ For example, among t r ad i t i ona l sector workers, the low incomes received 
by college graduates working as s t ree t vendors more probably reflect 
the peculiar (unmeasured) physical and mental l imitat ions of those 
par t icu la r indiviuals , who are working in that occupation despite a lot 
of education, more than i t ref lec ts the lack of sk i l l s that could be 
acquired during sixteen years of schooling. 
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Figure 3: 
BIAS FROM STRATIFICATION OF LABOR FORCE BY ENDOGENOUS 
INCOME-DETERMINING VARIABLE 
INCOME 
True effect of EDUC on INCOME 
stimated effect of 
EDUC on INCOME among 
office workers 
Estimated effect of EDUC on INCOME 
among factory workers 
EDUC 
Stra t i f ica t ion by the Dependent Variable (Income). Strat ifying 
the labor force by the dependent variable enta i l s running separate regressions 
'or workers with incomes above and below a predetermined amount. This kind of 
egmentation produces estimates of the effect of education on income that are 
nvalid. The estimates are biased downward for low-income workers for the 
easons given in the preceding discussion of endogenous income-determining 
actors: one of the effects of education i s to ra i se people's incomes and 
ence move them from the low-income sample to the high-income sample, and 
his effect i s ignored when samples are s t r a t i f i e d by the dependent var iables , 
igure 4 i l l u s t r a t e s th is problem. 
The same problem ar i ses if samples are s t r a t i f i e d by income-determined 
iriables, such as neighborhood. A correlat ion between benefits from education 
nd neighborhood of residence is both expected and spurious. 
In actual empirical research, the dangers of segmentation by the 
"ependent variable are par t icu lar ly acute. Figure 5 i l l u s t r a t e s , for Bogota, 
ow incorrect inferences might be drawn. We see that the benefits of educa-
ion for low-income workers would be misstated if separate earnings func-
tions were run within poverty and nonpoverty groups: in the sample as a 
•hole, each year of education raises incomes by about 15 percent; yet , within 
Ihe higher-income sample, the income gain i s attenuated because low-income 
orkers are systematically excluded; and, in the low income sample, the 
pparent effect of education on income i s negative! Segmenting by the depen-
dent variable understates the effect of education on income for every segment 
5and ought not to be done. 
-256-
Figure 4: 
ILLUSTRATION OF TRUNCATION BIAS: 
STRATIFICATION OF LABOR FORCE BY DEPENDENT VARIABLE (INCOME) 
Income 
Income Cutoff 
r,True effect of EDUC on 
*^ INCOME in full sample 
Estimated effect in truncated 
sample 
Figure 5: 
ESTIMATED EDUCATION-INCOME RELATIONSHIPS 
FOR WHOLE SAMPLE AND TRUNCATED SAMPLES IN BOGOTA 
log Y 
K High-income sample 
I^ Whole sample 
fr 
\Low-income sample 
* 
N P S H 
None Primary Secondary Higher 
EDUC 
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C. Conclusions on Different Benefits of Education for Different Groups 
In l ight of the in terpre ta t ive issues raised in section B, what 
lessons are we to draw from the empirical evidence in section A? We may 
legitimately conclude from the available evidence that the benefits of educa-
tion are greater for some groups than for others. The evidence may properly 
be interpreted as showing tha t , given the same measured education and s k i l l s , 
men earn more than women in most if not developing countries; some rac ia l 
groups in some countries do be t te r than others; In-raigrants in several coun-
t r i e s fare as well as comparable l ifelong residents at dest inat ion; and 
workers from poor socioeconomic backgrounds in several countries do as well as 
workers with the same education and experience who come from more advantaged 
backgrounds. These conclusions are derived from single-equation earnings func-
tions which contain sh i f t variables for exogenous income-determining var iables . 
When samples are s t r a t i f i e d by these exogenous variables (see Table 
7), i t may legitimately be inferred that the benefits from education are 
greater for men than for women in many countries, for Malays as compared with 
non-Malays in Malaysia, and for non-African workers in Tanzania. 
There are indications of other earnings differences among groups 
defined according to endogenous income-determining var iables , which include 
occupation, industry, firm s i ze , and region. Although biased to a certain 
degree, the estimated coefficients on these variables in single-equation 
earnings functions, and the estimated earnings functions themselves, differ so 
markedly as to suggest that education indeed receives more rewards in certain 
sectors of employment or regions than in others . Among the apparent findings 
of the studies noted in Table 7 are larger returns to education among modern 
sector workers versus t rad i t iona l sector workers in Colombia and Singapore; 
among white-collar versus blue-col lar workers in Malaysia; among urban versus 
rural workers in Colombia; for various occupational groups in Brazi l , Colombia, 
Iran, Malaysia, Peru, Thailand, and Vietnam; for workers in various industries 
in Brazil , Chile, India, and Malaysia; and for persons in various regions of 
Colombia and Yugoslavia. 
The relationship between returns to education and income i t se l f also 
demands a t tent ion. I t may correctly be said from the available evidence tha t , 
given the same education, the children of the poor generally do as well in the 
labor market as the children of the nonpoor. Moreover, despite some authors ' 
claims to the contrary, exist ing studies have not established that the poor 
themselves have less to gain from further education than have others. 
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IV. WHO RECEIVES HOW MUCH EDUCATION AND WHY? 
A. Differential Participation in Education 
Education in developing countries is highly valued for the income 
and nonincome benefits it brings. Still, very many children receive little o 
no education. One reason for this is the favored access to education enjoyed? 
by some individuals and the lack of school spaces for others. Another reason 
is that, even if school spaces are available, parents may choose not to send 
their children to school. This may be because of the need for their children 
labor in family farms or businesses, inability to pay school fees, or lack of J 
conviction that expenditures on education will prove to be worthwhile (for 
example, because the family is part of a group that is discriminated against) 
Research studies have demonstrated that all these factors contribute to I 
explaining patterns of school attendance and absence. 1/ However, the relati 
strength of supply-side and demand-side factors has not yet been analyzed 
definitively. 
From the point of view of income distribution, given that only some: 
people get educated, an important aspect is which people get educated how 
much. Unesco publications and other data sources document that educational 
systems in developing countries cater more to some groups than to others. 
1. Males and Females 
Table 8 shows that in developing countries, parents tend to favor 
the education of their sons over their daughters. For developing countries 
as a group, the probability of a male in the school age group (6-23 years 
old) being enrolled is about 40 percent higher than that of a female. Wider 
differences also exist in some regions; for example, in the Arab states 
this figure reaches 70 percent. 
The table also shows that educational opportunities by sex are even? 
more pronounced at older ages, which correspond to the higher educational 
levels. Again for developing countries as a group, the probability of a male 
being enrolled is higher than that of a female, by 30 percent for the first 
age group. (6-11 years), 48 percent for the second (12-17 years), and 84 
percent for the last (17-23 years). 
The evidence in Table 8 also shows that, with the expansion of 
the educational systems in the last fifteen years, these differentials have 
been reduced noticeably. Nonetheless, the gaps that remain are large and 
unfortunate. 
1/ A review of this literature is now being prepared by Mary Jean Bowman a 
C. Arnold Anderson. 
Table 8 
ENROLLMENT RATIOS BY AGE GROUPS AND SEX, 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1960 & 1975 
Deve lop ing 
c o u n t r i e s 
A f r i c a ( e x c l u d i n g 
Arab s t a t e s ) 
L a t i n America 
A s i a ( e x c l u d i n g 
Arab s t a t e s ) 
Arab s t a t e s 
Year 
1960 
1975 
1960 
1975 
1960 
1975 
1960 
1975 
1960 
1975 
MF 
4 6 . 8 
6 1 . 8 
3 0 . 1 
4 8 . 9 
5 8 . 5 
7 7 . 9 
5 3 . 9 
6 3 . 6 
3 9 . 1 
5 9 . 1 
6-11 
M 
5 6 . 1 
6 9 . 8 
3 7 . 1 
5 5 . 4 
5 9 . 0 
77 .7 
64 .8 
72 .8 
4 9 . 9 
7 1 . 8 
F 
3 7 . 2 
5 3 . 5 
2 3 . 1 
4 2 . 5 
5 8 . 0 
7 8 . 2 
42 .6 
5 3 . 8 
2 7 . 9 
4 6 . 0 
12-
MF 
2 1 . 6 
3 5 . 3 
1 7 . 4 
30 .7 
3 6 . 2 
5 6 . 5 
25 .8 
3 5 . 0 
1 8 . 0 
34 .6 
Age Groups 
-17 
M 
2 8 . 3 
4 2 . 0 
2 3 . 0 
37 .7 
3 8 . 7 
5 8 . 4 
3 2 . 9 
4 2 . 0 
25 .7 
44 .6 
F 
1 4 . 9 
2 8 . 3 
1 1 . 9 
23 .7 
3 3 . 5 
5 4 . 4 
1 8 . 5 
27 .6 
1 0 . 0 
24 .2 
18 
MF 
3 . 6 
9 . 0 
1 . 4 
3 . 9 
6 . 3 
1 9 . 7 
3 . 9 
8 . 1 
3 . 9 
1 2 . 3 
- 2 3 
M 
5 .2 
1 1 . 6 
2 . 2 
5 .8 
7 . 8 
2 2 . 0 
6 .0 
1 1 . 1 
6 .4 
1 7 . 1 
F 
1 . 9 
6 . 3 
0 . 6 
1 . 9 
4 . 9 
1 7 . 5 
1 .8 
4 .9 
1 . 3 
7 .2 
MF 
26 .6 
3 8 . 7 
1 8 . 0 
3 0 . 7 
3 7 . 3 
5 4 . 7 
3 0 . 5 
3 8 . 9 
2 2 . 6 
3 8 . 5 
6 -23 
M 
3 2 . 9 
4 4 . 8 
2 2 . 9 
3 6 . 1 
3 8 . 8 
5 5 . 9 
37 .7 
4 5 . 7 
3 0 . 2 
4 8 . 2 
F 
2 0 . 1 
3 2 . 3 
1 3 . 2 
2 5 . 3 
3 5 . 8 
5 3 . 4 
2 3 . 1 
3 1 . 6 
1 4 . 8 
2 8 . 5 
i 
1 
Source: Unesco S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook, 1976 . 
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2. Ethnic and Religious Groups 
Table 9 shows that some ethnic or religious groups within developing 
countries have less access to education. Contrast, for example, the dis-
tribution by educational levels of the white and the nonwhite population in 
Mozambique, or in Peru, that of Spanish-speaking people and those whose 
maternal language is indigenous. These are also some wide educational differ-
ences among ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Less clear are the differences in 
educational attainment between Malay and Chinese employees in Malaysia. 
Although idiomatic and cultural differences probably account for a signifi-
cant part of the inequality in educational attainments, unequal opportunities 
and discrimination against certain groups probably hold the key to understand-
ing the observed patterns. 
3. Urban and Rural Areas 
In most developing countries, urban children have many more oppor-
tunities to attend school than rural children. Some regions have virtually no 
upper-level schools or persons educated up to the secondary level or beyond. 
Although rural parents may express less demand for education than urban 
parents, the main reason for the disparity in rates of education between 
urban and rural children appears to be that more resources for education 
are provided in urban areas - hence, more schools are built and more school 
spaces are available. 
These differences are reflected in the educational composition of 
the urban and rural labor forces, for which evidence is presented in Table 10. 
For the fourteen developing countries covered, we can clearly see that wide 
disparities exist between urban and rural areas. The proportion of people in 
the rural areas with no schooling is always higher than that of the urban 
areas, whereas the opposite is true for secondary and postsecondary levels. 
Clearly, the lack of rural educational opportunities and selective rural-urban 
migration of the highly educated combine to leave the rural areas with only 
limited human resources. 
4. Socioeconomic Status 
There exis ts substant ia l evidence that poorer families are unable 
to enrol l as large a proportion of the i r children in school as are the more 
advantaged groups. Moreover, children coming from well-to-do families are 
s ignif icant ly overrepresented at the higher educational leve ls . The reasons 
for these d i spar i t i es are addressed in Section IV.B. 
Table 11 presents , for four developing countries, the proportions 
of children enrolled broken down by parents ' socioeconomic s t a tu s . In a l l 
cases i t is evident that enrollment rates are higher the bet ter the position 
of the parents . In Colombia, for example, the lowest 60 percent of the 
families (with annual per capita income less than 36,000 pesos) enrol l fewer 
than 50 percent of the i r children in education, whereas the enrollment rates 
among the top 7 percent (more than 120,000 pesos annually) r i s e to more than 
60 percent. 
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Table 9: 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY RACE, TRIBE OR RELIGIOUS GROUPS, SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
h untry and source 
1954 
Group 
lice: UNESCO 
it ist lcal Yearbook. 1976) 
;la. 1974 b/ 
jrce: Kazumdar 1979) 
Total population a/ 
Moslem population a/ 
Educational attainment (percent) 
Males, Kuala Lumpur 
Malay 
Chinese 
Males, East Coast towns 
Malay 
Chinese 
Females, Kuala Lumpur 
Malay 
Chinese 
Females, East Coast towns 
Malay Chinese 
Chinese 
No 
schooling 
79.8 
92.7 
No formal 
schooling 
2.0 
3.5 
9.4 
4.1 
1.5 
7.1 
14.8 
7.7 
First 
level 
18.1 
7.2 
Primary 
school 
42.7 
43.5 
55.2 
40.0 
25.7 
39.0 
10.9 
30.9 
Second 
level 
1.7 
0.2 
Some or 
completed 
secondary 
48.7 
47.9 
33.4 
52.4 
66.2 
51.6 
50.6 
57.7 
Post-
secondary 
0.4 
0.0 
Post-
secondary 
6.6 
5.2 
2.0 
3.8 
6.6 
2.3 
3.7 
1.9 
Illiterate Literate Primary Secondary Higher 
jbique, 1955 
jurce; Population 
msus, 1955) 
1972 
puree: Oficina Nacional 
Estadisticas y Censos, 
mm 
Ilanka, 1967 
•puree: cited in 
leonor 1977) 
Total population cj 
White 
Yellow 
Indiana 
Mixed 
Blacks 
Maternal language 
Total d/ 
Spanish 
Quechua 
Aymara 
Other autochthonous 
Foreign 
Ethnic group 
Sinhalese 
Ceylon Tamil 
Muslim 
Burgher 
Indian Tamil 
Other 
Total 
26. 
16, 
38, 
36, 
41, 
35 
Without 
schooling 
30. 
21, 
50, 
42, 
56 
6, 
27. 
27. 
27, 
30. 
26. 
28, 
Primary 
51.2 
Population e_/ 
71.0 
.1 
.7 
.4 
.6 
.2 
.0 
11  
6  
0  
10  
0  
100  
54, 
43, 
51, 
35 
27.8 
32.8 
36.5 
28.7 
25.1 
28.6 
34.2 
Secondary 
14.8 
19.1 
4.8 
5.0 
3.1 
37.5 
University 
admission 
84. 
14, 
1. 
0, 
0, 
0, 
100, 
11.0 
16.3 
5.5 
7.1 
3.2 
2.2 
Higher 
3.0 
3.9 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
20.9 
1.7 
2.8 
0.2 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
Not 
specified 
0.9 
1.0 
0.5 
0.4 
3.7 
7.6 
Religion 
Buddhist 
Hindu 
Muslim 
Christian 
Other 
Total 
66. 
18, 
6, 
8, 
0, 
100 
79.2 
10.9 
1.4 
7.8 
0.7 
100.0 
IRefers to population 25 years or o lder . Information is on employees only. All c iv i l ized popualtion. Includes population 5 years or o lder . Distribution of population by ethnic group corresponds to 1963. 
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Country 
Algeria 
Kenya 
Tunisia 
Dominican 
Republic 
Guatemala 
Chile 
Colombia 
Paraguay 
India 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
(West 
Malaysia) 
Sri Lanka 
Yemen, 
Democra-
tic 
Eepublic 
Source: 
Note: 
Year 
1971 
1969 
1966 
1970 
1973 
1970 
1973 
1972 
1971 
1971 
1970 
1970 
1971 
1973 
UNESCO 
TABLE 10 
Distribution of Population by Educational 
Attainment In Urban and Rural Areas 
Selected Developing Countries 
Highest Educational level attained 
Area No 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total b/ 
Urban b/ 
Rural b/ 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total 
Urban c/ 
Rural c/ 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total d/ 
Urban d/ 
Rural d/ 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Total c/ 
Urban c/ 
Rural c/ 
Statistical 
schooling First level Secondary level 
84.4 
73.5 
89.9 
75.9 
46.9 
79.5 
89.1 
78.4 
96.4 
40.1 
22.9 
52.8 
13.1 
8.3 
29.8 
22.4 
14.2 
38.4 
19.6 
11.2 
25.5 
72.2 
46.6 
78.6 
55.3 
22.0 
45.2 
40.6 
32.2 
43.9 
29.5 
20.6 
32.3 
72.9 
59.1 
80.0 
93.9 
85.2 
98.7 
72.6 
53.0 
86.2 
Yearbook, 1976 
a/ Those persons with completed 
in the post-secondary figures 
b/ Considers population of more 
c/ Considers population of more 
d/ Considers all population, 
e/ Those persons-with completed 
13.0 
20.5 
9.2 
20.5 
37.0 
18.5 
7.1 
13.7 
2.7 
65.9 
49.5 
43.2 
61.0 
60. l' 
64.2 
55.9 
54.8 
58.0 
68.0 
63.6 
71.1 
22.7 
36.8 
19.2 
39.1 
56.9 
51.4 
44.6 
42.7 
45.4 
58.9 
58.8 
58.9 
22.1 e/ 
30.2 e/ 
17.9 e/ 
2.2 
5.2 
0.6 
2.8 a/ 
5.3 a/ 
1.1 a/ 
3.0 
6.3 
0.8 
12.1 
23.5 
3.7 
4.9 
11.8 
1.1 
22.2 
27.0 
5.4 
18.4 
26.1 
3.5 
10.3 
20.4 
3.1 
3.9 
12.3 
1.8 
5.1 
14.1 
2.1 
21.8 
36.0 
12.0 
9.3 a/ 
14.0 a/ 
7.4 a/ 
9.4 
16.8 
7.1 
5 
10 
2 
Post-secondary 
1 e/ 
7 e/ 
1 e/ 
0.3 
0.8 
0.1 
0.8 a/ 
10.7 a/ 
0.9 a/ 
0.7 
1.7 
0.1 
1.9 
4.1 
0.3 
1.2 
2.9 
0.2 
3.8 
4.8 
0.6 
3.3 
4.9 
0.2 
2.1 
4.8 
0.2 
1.1 
4.2 
0.3 
0.5 
7.0 
1.3 
5.6 
11.0 
1.8 
5.5 a/ 
11.1 a/ 
3.2 a/ 
2.3 
3.9 
1.7 
secondary education are also included 
than 20 years old. 
than 10 years old. 
primary education are also included 
in the post primary figures. 
Table Hi 
ENROLLMENT RATIOS BY PARENTS' SOCIOECONOMIC POSITION, SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Country and Source 
Brazil. 1970 
(Source: Jallade 
1977) 
Socioeconomic Indicator 
Socioeconomic 
group of 
head of household 
Total males (nonfarm) 
Migrants from urban areas 
Migrants from rural areas 
Lov socioeconomic background 
Total males (farm) 
Migrants from rural areas 
Lov socioeconomic background 
Total females (nonfarm) 
Migrants from urban areas 
Migrants from rural areas 
Lov socioeconomic background 
Total females (farm) 
Migrants from rural areas 
Lov socioeconomic background 
1M 
Average monthly 
earnings (cruzeiros) 
873 
688 
691 
247 
252 
316 
91 
380 
520 
247 
187 
112 
96 
64 
Colombia, 1970 (Urban) 
(Source: Jallade 1974) 
Income bracket 
(pesos yearly) 
0 -
6,000 -
12,000 -
18,000 -
24,000 -
30,000 -
36,000 -
48,000 -
60,000 -
72,000 -
84,000 -
120,000 -
180,000 -
6,000 
12,000 
18,000 
24,000 
30,000 
36,000 
48,000 
60,000 
72,000 
84,000 
120,000 
180,000 
240,000 
Over 240,000 
seal Cpsisant) 
Enrollment 
ratios is basic 
education a/ 
77.5 
79.9 
69.1 
63.1 
45.0 
45.8 
37.2 
76.8 
77.5 
66.7 
64.4 
44.5 
43.2 
37.2 
Enrollment ratios in 
all levels b/ 
48.5 
43.1 
45.4 
48.2 
48.7 
47.6 
31.0 
54.4 
52. f 
56.8 
58.3 
64.9 
66.2 
61.9 
Total 
Colombia. 1974 
(Source: Selovsky 
1979b) 
Indis. 1962 (Rural) 
Qulntiles of household 
per capita income 
(poorest to richest) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Average 
Occupation 
(Cultivators) 
Big 
Medium 
Small 
Landless 
All groups 
Enrollment ratios Enrollment ratios 
In primary education c/ in secondary education 
72.2 17.1 
84.0 21.9 
86.6 28.2 
95.1 ' 43.8 
39.8 62.5 
82.9 31.5 
Enrollment Ratios In 
all levels d/ 
61.0 
48.8 
41.5 
34.9 
48.9 
Malaysia. 1974 
(Source; Datta and 
Meerman 1979) 
Qulntiles of household 
per capita income 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Mean 
Enrollment ratios In 
primary education e/ 
.85 
.86 
.93 
.99 
.90 
.90 
a/ Enrollnent ratios are for children 6-14 years old, apparently classified by socioeconomic group of head 
~ of household; basic education includes primary and lover secondary levels. 
b/ Enrollment rates are for children 5-25 years old, classified by family income. 
c/ Enrollment rates are for children 6-12 years old for primary level and 13-19 years old for secondary level; 
in both cases children are classified by family per capita income. 
d/ Enrollment rates are for children .5-15 years old, classified by family landholdlng status. 
e/ Enrollment rates are for children of primary school age, classified by family per capita Income. 
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Dispari t ies among socioeconomic groups are even greater at the higher 
educational leve ls . As Table 12 shows, higher-level students are dispropor-
t ionately from bet ter-off families, whatever the measure of s t a tus . 
I t i s noteworthy that par t ic ipa t ion in education thus appears to be 
more equally dis t r ibuted than income. Differences in enrollment rates between 
socioeconomic groups are never larger than a factor of 2, whereas the incomes 
of the groups concerned vary by a factor of 10 or more. 
I t is also true that the educational systems in developing countries 
are not completely closed to children from a poorer socioeconomic background. 
If we look at the composition of the student body, we see that significant 
numbers of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds are enrolled in the 
higher levels of education. Note, for example, that in Colombia in 1967, 23 
percent of the universi ty students had parents with primary education or 
l e s s ; in Kenya in 1970, about 50 percent of students in the teaching training 
colleges had parents with no education (Table 12). 
The d is t r ibu t ion of education among a sample of 331 urban workers 
in Colombia and of those workers' parents i s presented in Table 13. This 
data set shows tha t , although there is a pronounced re la t ion between parents' 
and children's education, the correlat ion i s far from perfect . There are 
large numbers of workers in the younger generation whose education greatly 
exceeds thei r p a r e n t s ' , even af ter allowing for the general expansion of 
Colombia's educational system in the l a s t generation; and at every educational 
level , considerable numbers of younger workers have attained less education 
than thei r parents . 
Those who argue that educational systems are s t r a t i f i ed and closed 
to the children of the poor see the facts in one way, and those who charac-
te r i ze developing count r ies ' educational systems as vehicles for social mobili 
see the facts otherwise. There is t ruth in both perceptions. 
5. Influence of Family Background on Achievement 
In the ea r l i e r par ts of this section, the emphasis was on quantity 
of education. If we look instead at the cumulative effects of qual i ty , as 
measured by s tudents ' t e s t scores, there seems to be a consensus that family 
background i s a s t a t i s t i c a l l y signif icant determinant of s tudents ' measured 
achievement in school (Bhagwati 1973; Bowles 1971; Psacharopoulos 1978). The 
empirical evidence is less clear on the extent of th is influence, not only 
in absolute terms but also as compared with other variables affecting achieve-
ment, such as student charac ter is t ics or school inputs. 
An example of th i s evidence i s reported by Leonar (1977) and 
i s reproduced in Table 14. Students in four developing countries were 
given a common reading comprehension t e s t . Students with more-advantaged 
socioeconomic backgrounds achieved higher scores in some of the learning 
categories, but in many more cases the differences in achievement were not 
s igni f icant . The evidence does not allow us to assess the importance of 
socioeconomic background in explaining the observed differences in scores. 
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Table 12: 
DISTRIBUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION STUDENTS BY PARENTS' 
SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND, SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Country and Source Socioeconomic indicator 
Colombia, 1967 
(Source: Rama 
1969) 
Distribution of education among 
students' parents (percent) 
India, 1954 
(Source: cited 
in Bhagwati 
1973) 
Level of instruc- . 
tion of fathers 
Primary or less 
Secondary 
University, incomplete 
University, complete 
Average monthly 
income of 
family (Rs.) 
Below 200 
200-499 
500 and above 
Not known 
University 
students 
23.0 
42.0 
8.0 
24.0 
College 
graduates 
29.1 
45.7 
23.3 
1.9 
Men, 40-59 
years old 
89.4 
9.0 
0.3 
1.4 
Income distribution 
of all families 
Urban Rural 
80.3 90.6 
15.7 8.5 
4.0 0.9 
(Source: 
1975b) 
Fields 
Occupational category 
High and middle 
level manpower 
Entrepreneurs, traders 
and businessmen 
Small-scale farmers 
Unskilled and 
traditional 
Educational attainment 
None 
At least some primary 
Secondary or beyond 
Percentage landowners 
Acreage if landowners 
0.1 - 4.9 
5.0 - 24.9 
25 and over 
23 
9 
54 
14 
49 
44 
7 
87 
34 
56 
10 
19 
9 
60 
12 
48 
48 
5 
87 
32 
56 
12 
Primary Secondary University Reference 
TTCs a/ TTCs a/ of Nairobi group 
35 
20 
44 
21 
56 
22 
73 
15 
50 
38 
3 1/ 
66 b/ 
31 b/ 
80 c/ 
18 c/ 
2 c / 
72 
52 d/ 
41 d/ 
7 d/ 
Korea, 1970 
(Source: 
Snodgrass 
1977) 
Occupational group of 
students/household heads 
Professional, technical 
and related 
Administrative and 
related 
Clerical and related 
Sales 
Service 
Agricultural, fishermen, 
and the like 
Production, transport, 
laborers 
Others 
University students Male labor force 
6.5 
5 
10 
14 
4 
12.7 
10 
34 
6.1 
8.1 
11.1 
4.4 
45.8 
24.5 
— Not available 
a/ TTC - Teacher Training Colleges. 
b/ Reference group: all adult males. 
c/ Reference group: all African males 40 years old and over. 
A/ Reference group: percentage of number of landholdlngs. 
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Table 13: 
EDUCATION OF PARENTS AND OF THEIR CHILDREN, FOUR COLOMBIAN CITIES, 1967 
Education of 
younger generation 
(years) 
0 
1-3 
3-5 
5-8 
8-11 
11 or more 
Average (Total) 
Note: Numbers in 
0 
3.6% 
(12) 
7.5% 
(25) 
3.6% 
(12) 
0.9% 
(3) 
0.3% 
(1) 
0.0% 
(0) 
16.0% 
(53) 
parenthes 
Mean education of 
1-3 
0.9% 
(3) 
10.0% 
(33) 
11.5% 
(38) 
4.5% 
(15) 
2.7% 
(9) 
0.3% 
(1) 
29.9% 
(99) 
3-5 
0.3% 
(1) 
4.5% 
(15) 
13.0% 
(43) 
8.2% 
(27) 
5.4% 
(18) 
2.1% 
(7) 
33.5% 
(111) 
es are numbers of 
parents 
5-8 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.9% 
(3) 
1.5% 
(5) 
3.0% 
(10) 
3.9% 
(13) 
2.7% 
(9) 
12.1% 
(40) 
(years) 
8-11 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.6% 
(2) 
0.9% 
(3) 
2.4% 
(8) 
2.7% 
(9) 
6.6% 
(22) 
individuals in 
11 or 
more 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.0% 
(0) 
0.6% 
(2) 
1.2% 
(4) 
1.8% 
(6) 
that cell 
Average 
(total) 
4.8% 
(16) 
23.0% 
(76) 
30.2% 
(100) 
17.5% 
(58) 
15.4% 
(51) 
9.1% 
(30) 
100.0% 
(331) 
• 
Source: Fields (1976, Table 7) 
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Table 14: 
STANDARDIZED MEAN SCORE DIFFERENCES IN READING COMPREHENSION 
TEST BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP, SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Children of professionals or 
executives vs. children of 
Children of professionals or 
executives vs. children of 
tem tested 
'unctional 
information 
lomprehension 
tpplication 
iigher mental 
processes 
Chile 
.031 
.725 d/ 
.656 d/ 
.262 
laborers 
India 
.407 d/ 
.211 
.146 
.104 
Iran 
.108 
.090 
.015 
a/ 
.374 d/ 
Thailand b/ 
.012 
.162 
.115 
.025 
farmers 
Chile 
.607 d/ 
.574 d/ 
.607 d/ 
.561 
or rural 
India c/ 
.393 
.940 
.653 
.063 
workers 
Iran 
.071 
.163 
.495 
.204 
The data represent the results from a common test applied by the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement in 21 countries. The population considered in the 
table are students in the last secondary grade. 
ource; Leonor (1977). 
/ Laborers are semiskilled workers. 
/ Laborers are craftsmen and skilled farmers. 
/ Rural workers are large-scale farmers. 
/ Coefficients represent differences between the means (for 
the two classes being compared) divided by the standard 
deviation for the population. Significant at 5 percent 
level or better. 
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A dif ferent l i n e of research on school achievement takes as i t s 
s tar t ing point the educational production function* These studies regress 
some indicator or indicators of educational performance against a set of 
variables which usually includes the student's personal and family charac-
t e r i s t i c s , school inputs , peer or fe l low student charac ter i s t i c s , and other 
relevant external influences* 
The evidence from educational production functions in developing 
countries has been surveyed recently by Schiefe lbein and Simmons (1979). On 
the basis of twenty-six s tudies from more than twenty developing countries, 
they find that the socioeconomic s ta tus of the s tudents ' parents i s a s t a t i s -
t i c a l l y s ign i f i cant predictor of school achievement in ten out of thirteen 
s tudies in which i t i s included. Moreover, many of these studies find that 
family background i s the s ing le most important determinant of school achieve-
ment. No indicat ion i s given, however, of how important the socioeconomic 
variable i s , for example, in explaining differences in achievement among 
students , or in re la t ion to other explanatory var iab les . Less clear i s how 
these differences in school achievement af fect future earnings. Empirical 
evidence in t h i s respect does not e x i s t for developing countries . 
B. On the Intergenerational Correlation of Education and Income 
The assoc ia t ion between parents ' and chi ldren's educations across 
generations i s we l l es tabl i shed from evidence such as that given in the 
foregoing s e c t i o n . Nobody questions that the children of the poor get less 
education on average than the children of the w e l l - t o - d o . The question i s 
why. 
The l i t era ture offers varying interpretat ions for the intergen-
erat ional correlat ion of educational attainments and for education's role in 
transmitting economic s ta tus across generations. These f a l l into two general 
c l a s s e s : human capi ta l theories and s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n theor ies . 
The human capi ta l theories emphasize the private benef i ts and costs 
associated with personal investments in education as the cause for intergen-
erat ional correlat ion of educational attainments and incomes. Ind iv idua l s 
(or fami l ies ac t ing on behalf of t h e i r ch i ld r en ) a re thought to choose that 
l e v e l of educat ion for which the p resen t value of expected fu ture income (or 
u t i l i t y ) i s maximized. The reason why some ind iv idua l s get more education 
than others in human c a p i t a l theory i s t h a t persons d i f f e r i n t h e i r a b i l i t y 
to benef i t from educat ion or in the cos ts they must pay to acqui re the educa-
t i o n , or i n bo th . Imperfect ions in c a p i t a l markets , lack of schools in a 
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l e , or o ther b a r r i e r s to investment in human c a p i t a l - if they 
a re considered a t a l l in human c a p i t a l theory - a re t y p i c a l l y considered as of 
secondary importance. 
As formulated by Becker (1964 and second e d i t i o n 1975; 1967) and 
amplif ied by Becker and Chiswick (1966), the human c a p i t a l model c lose ly 
p a r a l l e l s ba s i c investment theory . The funct ions desc r ib ing the p r i v a t e 
b e n e f i t s and cos t s from investment in educat ion correspond to the marginal 
e f f i c i ency of investment and marginal cos t of funds schedules in the standard 
theory of investment . The marginal e f f i c iency of investment function (MEI) 
gives the r e t u r n on the marginal d o l l a r spent on the l a s t year of education. 
This function i s thought to s lope downward because of diminishing r e t u r n s . 
The marginal cos t of funds (MCF) funct ion rep resen t s the cost of the funds 
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needed to pay for the education. This function increases with the amoung of 
education, reflecting both increasing opportunity costs (because the better-
educated forgo more income during the marginal year of school than do those 
with less education) and increasing direct costs (moving from the range where 
educational fees are paid for by the state, then to forgone consumption, then 
to withdrawals from savings, and then to increasingly expensive sources of 
borrowing). The downward-sloping MEI schedule and upward-sloping MCF schedule 
confronting a particular individual are illustrated in the following figure: 
Marginal cost 
and return to 
investment in 
education (in 
U.S. dollars) 
Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF) 
Marginal Efficiency of Investment (MEI) 
ED* Amount invested in education 
(in U.S. dollars spent or 
years purchased) 
According to human capi ta l theory, the individual in question would choose 
a quantity of education (ED*) and earn a marginal r a t e of return (r*) on 
his investment, because that i s the level a t which the marginal benefits 
and marginal costs of educational investment are equalized. 
Intergenerational aspects enter in by considering how the MCF and 
MEI functions are linked with parents ' education and other aspects of the 
person's socioeconomic background. Well-to-do parents are apt to be be t te r 
educated. These well-to-do parents presumably face lower costs than do poor 
parents, probably in absolute terms and certainly in re la t ion to the i r income. 
They are much less dependent on the i r children's labor; they can reduce con-
sumption while the poor must reduce savings; draw on savings while the poor 
must borrow at high rates of i n t e re s t ; or borrow at whatever ra te while 
the poor cannot borrow at a l l . Thus, the marginal cost functions are l ikely 
to be systematically higher for the children of the poor than for children 
from more favorable socioeconomic backgrounds. Individuals with high marginal 
cost functions, who must pay more to finance the i r education, would be 
expected to invest less in i t than individuals with low marginal cost func-
t ions, as shown in the following f igure: 
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MCF, MEI 
High MCF 
Low MCF 
MEI 
EDUC 
ED* ED* 
high low 
MCF MCF 
This is one reason why, in human capital theory, a correlation in educational 
attainments across generations would arise: poor parents must pay more and 
so they invest less; the less-educated are more apt to be poor, hence the 
less-educated parents have less-educated children. 
The other set of explanations offered by human capital theory 
for the perpetuation of relative educational positions across generations 
is on the benefit side. Some individuals earn more than others in the labor 
market because of superior intelligence, greater socialization toward accep-
tance of traditional lines of authority, better contacts with potential 
employers, or by discrimination against others unlike themselves. Such 
individuals gain more from the same education than do others, and so pre-
sumably invest more in education, as the following figure illustrates: 
MCF, MEI 
MCF 
High MEI 
Low MEI 
EDUC 
ED* ED* 
low high 
MEI MEI 
These same well-to-do individuals are able to transmit these advantages to 
thei r children in a variety of ways — including genetic inheritance, type of 
upbringing, resources available in the home, favoritism in the job market. 
He nee i t i s reasoned that children from advantaged backgrounds benefit more 
from education and so invest more; better-educated parents are more apt to be 
well-to-do, therefore better-educated parents have better-educated children. 
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The arguments from the two preceding paragraphs are combined in 
the following figure: 
MCF, MEI MCF, poorly-educated parents 
MCF, well-educated parents 
ED* 
Children 
of poorly 
educated 
parents 
ED* 
Children 
of well-
educated 
parents 
•MEI, well-educated parents 
MEI, poorly-educated parents 
EDUC 
This summarizes how human capi tal theor is t s explain inequality in educational 
attainments, the correlation between parental and child education, and the per-
petuation of such patterns over time. According to human capi ta l t heor i s t s , 
differences in education within a generation are explained by market oppor-
tun i t i e s ; across generations, market forces explain why the children of highly 
educated parents are themselves more l ikely to be highly educated. 
In each generation, people with more education earn higher incomes. 
Better-educated parents are apt to have both higher incomes and b e t t e r -
educated children. These better-educated children, in turn, are more l ikely 
themselves to have higher incomes. Consequently, a high correlat ion between 
parents ' incomes and chi ldren 's incomes is expected. Hence, human capi tal 
theory offers strong market-based explanations of why education transmits 
economic s ta tus across generations. If the cycle i s to be broken, there i s a 
need for market intervention on behalf of the children of poorly-educated 
parents, at a minimum by lowering the marginal cost of funds (MCF) they must 
pay, if not also by reducing differences in the marginal efficiency of inves t -
ment (MEI) by breaking down discrimination and other barr iers to the i r oppor-
tuni t ies in the labor market. 
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Soclal s t r a t i f i c a t i o n theories emphasize other aspects of the 
intergenerat ional transmission of economic posit ion and the role of education 
in that process. Social inequality theor is t s place heavy weight on the role 
of intergenerational transmission of values: well-to-do parents inculcate 
the i r children with i n i t i a t i v e , perseverance, appreciation of education, 
and acceptance of the exist ing socioeconomic order. Analysts of class struc-
tu re , many of them radica l in the i r or ientat ion, note that individuals often 
agree, t ac i t l y if not formally, to band together to advance the i r own group's 
i n t e r e s t . Examples are the exclusive job networks in which nepotism and 
favoritism are central in determining access to employment opportunities. 
Theorists who argue that the labor market i s segmented focus on the barriers 
faced by the poor, who for example lack access to schools and therefore are not 
free to choose the i r level of education. 
Together, these a l ternat ive theories challenge the human capital 
t heo r i s t ' s premise that educational outcomes ref lect different individuals ' 
assessments of the marginal costs and marginal benefits of further educational 
investments. Human capi ta l theor i s t s would respond by observing that even 
the leas t advantaged members of society usually could choose to invest in 
the education of thei r children at some pr ice , though the price might be many 
times larger than the family's resources and thus would be prohibi t ive . 
From my reading of the various l i t e r a tu res on the causes of 
inequali ty, I conclude that the various approaches are rather similar in 
the i r accounts of the proximate reasons for inequality and education's 
role in i t . Analysts of various persuasions generally agree that the mone-
tary costs and benefits of education are central to determining which 
parents spend how much on the education of thei r children; and education 
i s usually seen as the most important determinant of a person's economic 
posit ion (whether gauged by income, occupation, or some other measure). 
The human capi ta l and social s t r a t i f i c a t i on theories appear to 
differ in two important dimensions: s t r a t i f i c a t i on theor is t s go further 
than human capi tal theor i s t s by looking to the functioning of the economic 
system and the social and h i s t o r i c a l context in which i t operates to under-
stand the root causes of inequali ty, and s t r a t i f i c a t i o n theor i s t s are less 
will ing than human capi ta l theor i s t s to regard the resul t ing pat tern of 
income dis t r ibut ion as jus t simply because market forces provide powerful 
explanations for the observed outcomes. 
These various approaches have led to different hypotheses about 
the relationship between dis t r ibut ion of education and dis t r ibut ion of 
income. In the human capi ta l t r ad i t ion , Mincer (1970) and Chiswick (1971) 
reasoned that the degree of income inequality in a country should be related 
posit ively to at leas t four factors : (1) the level of education in the 
population, (2) the dispersion of education in the population, (3) the ra te of 
return to educational investments, and (4) the dispersion in rates of return 
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to educational investments. 1/ I sha l l not try to develop these models here; 
the interested reader i s referred to Mincer's (1976) and Rosen's (1977) survey 
papers for reviews of the relevant l i t e r a t u r e s . 
An a l ternat ive i s the so-called job competition model (see Thurow 
1975), by which an expansion of the educational system only affects the 
distr ibution of workers within the queue for jobs. Thus, if the d is t r ibut ion 
of job opportunities does not change, the overall income d is t r ibu t ion does 
not change if more people are educated. All that happens i s that the newly 
educated workers get jobs at the expense of those persons who do not get 
additional education. Moreover, Thurow's specif ic version of the model 
predicts that more people being educated would widen the wage di f ferent ia ls 
between the more educated and less educated, though other models similar to 
the job competition model suggest otherwise. 2/ 
A more radical approach associated with the names of Bowles, Gint is , 
and Carnoy has also been propounded. 3/ The essence of these views i s a 
theory of c lass : the educational system helps to legitimize the positions of 
the e l i t e at the top of the socia l s t ruc ture and to perpetuate the exist ing 
social hierarchy and modes of production. The author say the educational 
system does th is by establ ishing a meritocracy, by inculcating pupils with 
att i tudes of acceptance toward the prevail ing socioeconomic order, and 
by providing greater access to education for the children of more favored 
parents. Thus, in the r a d i c a l s ' conception, schooling (and i t s expansion) 
perpetuate income and class differences across generations. 4/ 
\J The specific equation (from Chiswick, 1971) i s : 
2 2 2 
Var(ln Y) - k [N' Var(r) + r ' Var(N) + Var(N) Var(r)] 
where Y is individual earnings, k is the rate of human capital invest-
ment, N' is the average number of years of training in the population, 
and r' is the average rate of return to investment in training. 
2/ Cf. the "bumping model" in Fields (1974). 
3/ Early statements of these views may be found in Carnoy (1971) and 
Bowles (1971). More full developed treatments are the books by Carnoy 
(1972) and Bowles and Gintis (1975). Among their most recent works 
are Carnoy (1977) and Bowles (1978). 
4/ In Bowles' words (1978, p. 784): "In this interpretation, the state 
serves to reproduce the social relations which define the position 
of the capitalist class and other dominant groups of the society... 
The educational system, as an important influence on political life, 
ideology, and the development of labor power as an input into the 
production process, is one of the main instruments of the state. The 
'output' of school is the reproduction or transformation of social 
relations...." 
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To validate any of these alternative hypotheses, information is 
required on changes in income inequality in relation to changes in the 
distribution of education. So far, the data available are too scanty to 
permit systematic analysis. 
C. Conclusions on Who Receives How Much Education and Why 
It is clear from the evidence presented in this section that 
educational opportunities differ among different groups in developig coun-
tries. Whether stratified by sex, racial or tribal group, geographic loca-
tion, or parents' socioeconomic status, differential participation in the 
educational system is a very important cause of income inequality and of its 
perpetuation over time. It has also been recognized that the children of the 
poor learn comparatively less well according to various measures of learning 
achievement. No direct evidence exists, however, on how such differentials 
affect income inequality in developing countries. 
This section has considered alternative theories of the intergenera-
tional correlation of educational attainments and of education's role in 
transmitting economic status across generations. Among the reasons why the 
least-advantaged groups invest less in the education of their children are 
market conditions that work against the poor and limitations on opportunities 
imposed by the class structures of stratified societies. Alternative theore-
tical paradigms lead to different predictions about whether income inequality 
will rise, fall, or remain unchanged as educational opportunities expand. 
Empirical testing , however, awaits better data. 
V. THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF EDUCATION 
Given the evidence on the large private returns to education in 
developing countries, it would seem at first that the social benefits of 
education ought also to be considerable. The private benefits are fre-
quently used with modification to approximate the social benefits of 
devoting further resources to education. This section reviews estimates 
of social returns to education in developing countries, summarizes the 
disagreement in the literature over the usefulness of the standard cal-
culations, and considers another kind of social benefit — reduced income 
inequality. 
A. Education and the Incidence of Poverty 
The evidence linking increased education with higher income and 
lower incidence of poverty is considerable. For 41 developing countries, 
Table 15 shows a clear correlation between the proportion of poor in a 
country (defined as persons with annual incomes below US$50 per capita) and 
the educational attainment of its citizenry (as measured by the proportion 
of adults with no schooling). For the countries in the table, the correla-
tion coefficient between the percentage poor and the percentage unschooled 
is +0.45. But it is also evident that both measures are highly correlated 
with the level of gross national product (GNP) per capita; the respective 
correlation coefficients are -0.67 between the proportion of poor and GNP, 
and -0.51 between the proportion of adults with no schooling and GNP. 
-275-
Table 15: 
EDUCATION AND THE INCIDENCE OF POVERTY, SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Percentage of total 
population with annual Percentage of adult 
incomes per capita population with 
below US$50 no schooling a/ 
14.0 
15.4 
2.3 
11.0 
37.0 
13.5 
9.0 
28.0 
10.0 
7.8 
Latin America 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Panama 
Peru 
Puerto Rico 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
1969 GNP 
per capita 
(U.S. dollars) 
1,054 
347 
751 
347 
512 
323 
264 
295 
390 
265 
640 
645 
692 
480 
1,600 
649 
974 
8 
42 
13 
22 
20 
40 
32 
54 
12 
65 
3 
6 
1 
4 c/ 
6 
1 
9 
7 
9 b/ d/ 
9 b/ 
18.8 b/ 
89 
24 
35 
14 
8 c/ 
9 
0 
4 
14.1 b/ 
49.1 b/ 
3.5 
18.9 
2.5 
Asia 
Burma 72 53.6 
India 100 44.5 
Iran 350 8.5 
Iraq 316 24.0 
Korea 224 5.5 
Malaysia 323 11.0 
Pakistan (East 
and West) 100 32.5 
Philippines 233 13.0 
Sri Lanka 95 33.0 
Thailand 173 26.8 
Turkey 290 12.0 
Africa 
Chad 75 43.1 
Gabon 547 15.7 
Ivory Coast 237 7.0 
Madagascar 119 53.8 
Niger 94 33.0 
Rhodesia 274 17.4 
Senegal 229 22.3 
Sierra Leone 165 43.5 
South Africa 729 12.0 
Tanzania 92 57.9 
Tunisia 241 22.5 
Uganda 128 21.3 
Zambia 340 6.3 
... Negligible. 
Sources: For data on 1969 GNP and percentage of population with low annual 
income per capita, Ahluwalia (1974, p. 12); for percentage of 
population with no schooling, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1976. 
a/ Adult population refers to persons of 25 or more years old; information 
is for circa 1970. 
b/ Circa 1960. 
c/ Population 20 or more years old. 
d/ Population 15 or more years old. 
e/ Only urban areas, 1953. 
ij For 1965 or 1966. 
&l Includes all ages, 
h/ Illiterates in the population 15 or more years old. 
67 
72 
88 
94 
72 
40 
85 
19 
29 
34 
58 
94 
87 
95 
66 
98 
43 
94 
94 
49 
71 
89 
71 
63 
.0 e/ 
.2 
.5 f/ 
.9 f/ 
6 
6 £./ 
6 b/ 
8 
5 
1 
0 f / 
4 b/ h/ 
6 b/ h/ 
0 b/ h/ 
5 h/ 
6 b/ 
0 
h/ 
4 b/ h/ 
4 b/ h/ 
5 b/ 
9 h/ 
1 f/ 
8 
9 
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At the regional level within countries, Table 16 shows for nine 
Latin American countries that differences in poverty rates between urban 
and rural areas are associated with rural-urban education differences. 
Notably more poverty and greater illiteracy were observed in rural areas. 
The whole literature on the relationship between education and 
poverty at the aggregate level is plagued by a persistent difficulty: the 
problem of two-way causation. One possibility is that the negative correla-
tion between education and poverty arises primarily because a better-educate 
populace contributes to economic growth. This would be the position of hum 
resource optimists. But there is another possibility. Undoubtedly, some po 
countries spend little on education because they cannot afford to spend more. 
With economic growth comes the ability to spend more on both investment and 
consumption goods; education fits into both categories. Assuredly, educa-
tional growth causes economic growth and economic growth permits educational 
growth, but the relative importance of these two simultaneous effects has not 
yet been demonstrated satisfactorily. 
In short, with more education comes less poverty, whether at the 
level of the nation, the region within a country, the family, or the indivi-
dual. But, to repeat an earlier observation, the existing literature has 
not established to what extent education is the cause of poverty reduction 
and to what extent the result. 
B. Social Rates of Return; The Evidence 
Social rates of return are the standard approach in the economics 
of education for evaluating countries' past educational performance and in 
planning education for the future. I should say at the outset that I have 
serious conceptual reservations about the validity of these calculations 
for developing countries. But before I go into the reasons, let us look 
at the numbers. 
Social rates of return have been calculated for many countries, 
both developed and developing. The available evidence has been synthesized 
by Psacharopoulos (1973) and is reported in Table 17. 
Three findings of Table 17 are of interest. One is that, for 
nearly all countries at all educational levels, the private rate of return 
exceeds the social rate. For higher education, the difference is 6.2 per-
centage points (between an average private rate of return of 17.5 percent 
and an average social rate of 11.3 percent. For secondary education, the 
difference is smaller but still noticeable: 2.8 percentage points (the 
private return averages 16.3 percent, while the social return is 13.5 per-
cent). That private returns are larger than social returns reflects society's 
subsidization of education, so that costs are borne partly by taxpayers and 
not fully by the students themselves. This is often thought necessary because 
individuals would otherwise invest too little in education compared with 
the true social payoff. Reasons for this claim are listed in Thurow (1970, 
Chapter 7). 
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Table 16: 
EDUCATION AND THE INCIDENCE OF POVERTY: REGIONAL COMPARISONS WITHIN 
NINE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Percentage of households 
below the poverty line a/ 
Percentage of pop population 
that is illiterate b/ 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Chile 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Urban 
5 
35 
38 
15 
12 
40 
20 
28 
20 
Rural 
19 
73 
54 
30 
25 
75 
49 
68 
36 
National 
8 
49 
45 
24 
17 
65 
34 
50 
25 
Urban 
5.8 c/ 
20.0 
11.2 
4.9 
7.6 
26.1 c/ 
21.3 c/ 
12.6 
20.9 c/ 
Rural 
18.1 
53.6 
34.7 
17.0 
27.2 
64.6 
48.9 
51.9 
62.7 
£/ 
c/ 
£/ 
£/ 
National 
8.6 c/ 
33.8 
19.2 
11.6 
11.9 
55.0 c/ 
34.6 c/ 
27.6 
36.7 c/ 
Sources: Altimir (1978) and UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1976. 
aj 1970 estimates. 
b_/ The reference group is population 15 years or older; estimates 
are for the early 1970s except when noted, 
c/ Circa 1960. 
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Table 17: 
SOCIAL AND PRIVATE RATES OF RETURN BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND COUNTRY, 
SELECTED DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
(Percentages) 
United States 
Canada 
Puerto Rico 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Colombia 
Chile 
Brazil 
Great Britain 
Norway 
Sweden 
Denmark 
The Netherlands 
Belgium 
Germany 
Greece 
Turkey 
Israel 
India 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
The Philippines 
Japan 
S. Korea 
Thailand 
Hawaii 
Nigeria 
Gnana 
Kenya 
U&anda 
N. Rhodesia 
New Zealand 
1959 
1961 
1959 
1963 
1957 
1966 
1959 
1962 
1966 
1966 
1967 
1964 
1965 
1967 
1964 
1964 
1968 
1958 
1960 
1967 
1966 
1966 
1961 
1967 
1970 
1959 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1963 
1960 
1966 
Primary 
17.8 
• • a 
17.1 
25.0 
82.0 
40.0 
24.0 
10.7 
• • • 
16.5 
20.2 
9.3 
6.6 
7.0 
12.0 
30.5 
24.1 
23.0 
18.0 
21.7 
66.0 
12.4 
Social 
Secondary 
14.0 
11.7 
21.7 
17.0 
17.0 
24.0 
16.9 
17.2 
3.6 
7.2 
10.5 
• • • 
5.2 
• • • 
3.0 
• • • 
6.9 
16.8 
12.3 
17.6 
21.0 
5.0 
9.0 
13.0 
4.4 
12.8 
13.0 
19.2 
28.6 
19." 4 
Higher 
9.7 
14.0 
16.5 
23.0 
23.0 
8.0 
12.2 
14.5 
8.2 
7.5 
9.2 
7.8 
5.5 
9.3 
• • • 
8.0 
8.5 
6.6 
12.7 
10.7 
14.6 
11.0 
6.0 
5.0 
11.0 
9.2 
17.0 
16.5 
8.8 
12.0 
13.2 
Primary 
155.1 
> 100.0 
32.0 
• • • 
> 50.0 
11.3 
... 
• • • 
... 
27.6 
24.7 
• • • 
• • • 
7.5 
• • • 
• • • 
56.0 
>100.0 
30.0 
24.5 
32.7 
• • * 
• • • 
• • • 
Private 
Secondary 
19.5 
16.3 
23.4 
23.0 
18.0 
32.0 
• • • 
21.4 
6.2 
7.4 
• • • 
8.5 
• • • 
• • • 
5.0 
24.0 
6.9 
19.2 
• • • 
20.0 
28.0 
6.0 
• • • 
14.5 
5.1 
14.0 
17.0 
30.0 
• • • 
• • • 
20.0 
Highjj 
13.6. 
19.7 
27.9 
29.0 
27.0 
15.SJ 
• ••' 
38.i; 
12.0 
7.7« 
10.3-
10.0 
10.4 
17.0 
4.6 
14.0 
26.0 
8.0 
14.3 
25 .'4 
12.5 
9.0 
14 !o 
11,0 
34.0 
37.0 
27.4 
• • • 
14.7 
... Negligible 
Source: Psacharopoulos (1973, p. 62). 
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Table 18; 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIVATE AND SOCIAL RATES OF RETURN TO EDUCATION 
IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(Percentages) 
Educational level 
Country 
type 
Developed 
Developing 
Private 
11.9 
(7) 
18.5 
(14) 
Secondary 
Social 
9.5 
(8) 
15.2 
(18) 
Difference 
2.4 
3.3 
Private 
11.9 
(11) 
22.0 
(14) 
Higher 
Social 
9.4 
(10) 
12.3 
(8) 
Difference 
2.5 
9.6 
All 16.3 13.5 2.8 17.5 11.3 6.2 
Note; Numbers of countries are in parentheses. 
Source; Psacharopoulos (1973, p. 67). 
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A second finding is that developing countries have higher rates 
of return on average than developed countries, as can be seen from Table 18. 
This finding is offered by some as evidence for the proposition that poor 
countries are underinvesting in education compared with richer countries 
(and, for that matter, compared with the opportunity cost of capital). 
One policy implication of this view might be to direct a large fraction 
of the world's resources toward education in low-income countries. 
A third general pattern in Psacharopoulos' data is that primary 
education generally has a higher social rate of return than secondary and 
higher education, as Table 19 indicates. 
Table 19; 
RELATIVE RANKING OF SOCIAL RATES OF RETURN BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
Number of developing countries by 
rank of social rate of return 
Educational level 1st 2nd 3rd 
Primary 14 1 3 
Secondary 4 9 5 
Higher -- 8 10 
Source; Psacharopoulos (1973, P. 66). 
This is often taken to imply that these countries should invest a larger 
proportion of their educational budgets in lower levels of education. Some 
would even go so far as to say that the education sector is misallocating 
its resources if it puts money into higher education when the highest rate 
of return is elsewhere. 
I agree with the practical conclusions of the preceding para-
graphs but not for the reasons given. My reasons are given in the follow-
ing section. 
C. Critique of Social Rate of Return Analysis 
Social rate of return analysis is predicated on the assumption 
that differences in incomes among individuals with different educational 
attainments reflect differences in their social marginal productivity, and 
that those differences are because of the education they have received. 
This assumption is indefensible, I submit, in the circumstances of sub-
stantial unemployment and underemployment that characterize most developing 
countries' labor markets. It is a matter of some debate whether social 
rates of return are even approximately valid under the conditions prevailing 
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in the developing countries' labor markets. I think not, for reasons given 
below. Mine is, however, an unusually critical position. The mainstream 
view is more positive—see, for example, the survey paper by Berry and 
Sabot (1979) and the other papers in this volume. 
A thorough social rate of return analysis would contain at 
least the following features: 
o Identifying the Beneficiaries. Educational programs are usually 
justified on the basis of the number of beneficiaries. But also 
important here is a characterization of the beneficiaries by 
socioeconomic status. It should be shown that the beneficiaries 
are drawn from the selected group; fears that educational expan-
sion caters mainly to the elite should be allayed. 
o Measuring Size of Benefits. To assess the economic benefits, 
information is needed on what the newly educated persons are 
doing. What kind of work do they find and how much do they 
earn from it? How much more productive are they in that work 
after education than before? Are others without education 
being displaced, and, if so, what are they doing instead? 
o Quantifying magnitude of costs. Account must be taken of both 
the direct costs of education and the opportunity costs. Often, 
for an educational program, the relevant comparison is with the 
costs of some other educational program. For example, the opportu-
nity cost of educating one additional student for one year at a 
university is that of X fewer elementary school pupils. 
o Estimating incidence of costs. School fees are typically a 
fraction of the total cost. The incidence of fees and forgone 
earnings parallels the incidence of benefits. But the incidence 
of other direct costs must also be estimated. This is where such 
features of the tax structure as its progressivity or regressivity, 
and overall budget surplus or deficit, enter in. It is probably 
the case in many developing countries that taxpayers as a group, 
including many poor families, help to subsidize the education of 
the few, who are drawn disproportionately from the middle and upper 
classes. 
o Consideration of other social benefits. In concentrating here on 
the economic benefits, other social benefits should not be dis-
regarded. These benefits should be considered, even though they 
probably cannot be precisely quantified. 
Compared with this list, cost-benefit analysis of education as 
actually practiced (see Table 20) is strikingly deficient. It should be 
evident from Table 20 that the so-called "social rates or return" to invest-
ments in education leave a great deal to be desired. As conventionally 
computed, the average social rates of return neither indicate all the right 
questions nor measure all the right phenomena. A detailed critique of the usual 
methods appears in the appendix to this paper. 
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Table 20: 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION IN PRACTICE 
Aspect of cost-benefit analysis Treatment in literature 
Identifying the beneficiaries 
Measuring size of benefits 
Quantifying magnitude of costs 
Estimating incidence of costs 
Consideration of other 
social benefits 
Number of beneficiaries usually is taken 
into account; composition of beneficiaries 
is usually ignored 
Usually assumes that marginal benefits = 
average benefit; this is unjustifiable in 
cases of labor surplus (see appendix) 
Usually done well 
Sometimes included as an afterthought; 
most frequently is ignored 
Sometimes is done; may be used to over-
ride cost-benefit calculations 
D. Distribution of Education and Inequality of Income 
An important social benefit of education may be to affect the income 
distribution in such a way as to reduce income inequality. The available evi-
dence is of two kinds: international cross-section at a single point in time, 
and intertemporal comparisons within countries. 1/ 
1. Cross-Sectional Studies 
The earlier empirical studies, some in the human capital tradi-
tion and some not, performed cross-sectional analyses relating education 
variables to different countries' income inequality at a single point in 
time. One set of studies examined educational levels (as measured by school 
enrollment ratios, literacy rates, or average educational attainment) and 
consistently reported a negative relation between educational level and in-
come inequality. 2/ Adelman and Morris (1973), using a sample of forty-
three developing countries, concluded that the "rate of improvement of human 
_1/ In presenting this evidence, I pass over the question of how inequality 
is best measured. The inequality indices in common use are satisfactory 
for the purposes at hand. 
2/ The reader may have noticed that the Mincer-Chiswick model leads to 
the prediction that level of education is positively related to income 
inequality, whereas the empirical evidence shows a negative relation. 
These are not necessarily inconsistent findings, since Mincer and Chiswick'a 
predictions relate to ceteris paribus effects 
and the empirical evidence reflects the effects of everything, including 
changes in the education level. 
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resources" (as measured by the school enrollment rate) was a significant 
negative determinant of income inequality. A similar negative relation 
between school enrollment and income inequality was found in subsequent 
research by Chenery and Syrquin (1975), who used a somewhat larger sample 
of developing countries. Consistent with these results are the findings of 
Ahluwalia (1974, 1976a, 1976b), based on a sample of sixty-two developing 
countries, that higher levels of literacy are associated with lower relative 
income inequality in the cross section. 
I am aware of three studies that have looked at the dispersion of 
education and its relation to income inequality. One is that of Chiswick 
(1971). Because of data limitations at the time, he was restricted to a 
cross section of just nine countries, four of them developing. Using three 
different inequality measures, he found a statistically significant relation 
between income inequality and the variable measuring inequality of educational 
attainments, with the anticipated positive sign in two out of three cases. 
The other study is that of Psacharopoulos (1978) - which for forty-nine coun-
tries (eleven of them developed), showed that educational inequality, was 
positively and significantly associated with the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality, even after controlling for the level of per capita income. 
Further evidence on the relations between the level and dispersion 
of schooling and income distribution has been presented recently by Winegarden 
(1979). Using data from thirty-two countries (eighteen of them developing), 
he regressed the share of income of the bottom four-fifths of households in 
each country against the mean and variance of educational attainment of their 
population. His results were consistent with those of previous studies. Both 
the level and the dispersion of education are significant in explaining income 
inequality: the mean educational attainment is negatively related to income 
inequality, and greater inequality in educational attainment is associated 
with higher income inequality. 
To summarize the cross-sectional evidence, studies to date suggest 
that those developing countries with higher levels of education exhibit less 
income inequality. With respect to the dispersion of education, the three 
studies reviewed above report that greater inequality of educational attain-
ments is associated with greater income inequality. 
2. Intertemporal Studies 
Turning to intertemporal comparisons within countries, one finds that 
the evidence is limited. A number of observers (e.g., Jallade 1979; Carnoy 1977) 
have called attention to a seeming paradox: despite the rapid growth of 
educational systems in developing countries, there has been at best little 
reduction in income inequality in those countries. An analysis (Fields 1978b) 
for five developing countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, India, Philippines and Sri 
Lanka) concluded that there is "... a closer relationship between educational 
performance and aggregate economic growth than between educational performance 
and distribution (in terms either of relative inequality or of absolute 
poverty)." 
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These facts should not be regarded as anomalous, since it is the 
distribution of education, much more than the level of education, that we 
would expect to be associated with income inequality. 
A more systematic method for investigating the relationship between 
education and income inequality has been applied by Langoni (19 72) and Fishlow 
(1973) for Brazil. In trying to explain the increased inequality in incomes 
in Brazil over the 1960s, both studies decompose the change in income inequa-
lity, as measured by the log variance indicator, into three components: 
changes in the educational composition of the labor force, changes in the 
average incomes received by each educational group, and changes in income 
inequality within each educational group. 1/ According to Langoni and Fishlow, ; 
the changes in each of these components led to greater income inequality in 
Brazil. However, both authors strongly differ in how they interpret these 
changes. On the one hand, Langoni (1972) argues that increased inequality 
is a natural, but temporary, result of the speed at which the Brazilian econ-
omy grew, especially at the end of the 1960s. By this reasoning, increased 
income inequality should not be considered an undesirable aspect of economic 
growth over the period. On the other hand, Fislow (1973) emphasizes the role 
of governmental policies, which favored a select few, as the main cause of 
the increase in income inequality. In his view, rising inequality offsets 
the welfare gains associated with income growth, so that it is even ques-
tionable whether welfare increased at all. 
What this debate points out, for our purposes, is that it is of 
primary importance to understand the causal mechanisms by which education and 
income distribution are related. Only with this understanding can the con-
tribution of education to income equality (or inequality) be fully assessed. 
1/ Chiswick and Mincer (1972) developed a different framework to explain 
changes in income inequality over time while working with a dynamic 
version of the basic human capital equation. The four human capital 
variables in their analysis are the level and dispersion of education and 
the level and dispersion of rates of return to education. If those four 
factors enter into the determination of income inequality at a single 
point in time, then, by first differencing, it follows that changes in 
income inequality over time can be explained in part by changes in those 
four factors, by the levels of those factors, and by the correlations 
among them. Chiswick and Mincer used this framework to analyze changes 
over time in income distribution in the United States. These authors are 
strong advocates of the human capital approach to income distribution 
analysis, which many students of developing countries find to be of positive 
but limited value. Logically, one need not adhere to all the premises of 
human capital analysis—in particular the strong market orientation and 
marginal productivity assumptions—to accept the Chiswick-Mincer formu-
las as a point of departure for empirical research. 
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E. Conclusions on the Social Benefits of Education 
One social benefit of education is higher national income. Another 
is a lower incidence of poverty. The associations between the amount of edu-
cation (as measured by school enrollment ratios, literacy rates, or average 
educational attainment), the level of national income, and the incidence of 
poverty are well documented. At the national, regional, or even micro level, 
when education goes up, aggregate income goes up and poverty goes down. But 
association is no proof of causation, since it is true both that a high level 
of education causes higher national income and reduced poverty and that higher 
national income and reduced poverty permit a high level of education. Re-
searchers have not yet resolved which of these two simultaneous effects is 
relatively more important. But even if it were demonsrated that the princi-
pal reason for the observed correlations is that educational growth causes 
higher national income and reduced poverty, this would be presumptive but 
insufficient grounds for deciding to expand education, since the costs of 
further education have yet to be entered into the calculation. 
The private benefits and costs of education are sometimes used with 
modification to approximate the social returns to devoting further resources 
to education. The consensus in the literature is that private rates of return 
to education appear to exceed social rates, that developing countries have 
higher rates of return on average than developed countries, and that primary 
education generally has a higher social rate of return than secondary or 
higher education. Though these conclusions may be right, they are based on 
what I consider to be a weak methodological foundation. There is some 
disagreement in the literature on the usefulness of standard social rate 
of return calculations under the labor market conditions that prevail in 
developing countries. I personally regard the estimates as so distorted that 
they greatly overstate the true social returns to higher levels of education, 
but my position is not generally shared. Although social cost-benefit analy-
ses indicate the right questions, they must do a better job of answering 
them. 
Another possible social benefit of education is diminishing income 
inequality. For evidence on the relations between education and income in-
equality, we must rely primarily on cross-sectional patterns. These patterns, 
though only suggestive, are consistent on two points: those countries with 
higher levels of education exhibit less income inequality on average; and, on 
balance, greater disparities in educational attainments among the population 
are associated with greater income inequality. Little evidence on inter-
temporal change is available, and what evidence there is is inconclusive. 
Systematic procedures have still to be applied to analyze the growth of 
education and changing income inequality in developing countries. 
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VI. EDUCATIONAL FINANCE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
Another way in which educational systems may affect the distribu-
tion of income is by charging some income groups a larger share of the costs 
of education than their children receive in benefits and by using the pro-
ceeds to subsidize the education of others. This chapter discusses how 
educational systems in developing countries are financed and how the costs 
and benefits of education are distributed across income groups. 
A. Educational Finance 
Are the costs of education in developing countries distributed 
equally? Or do some groups pay more than others? The answer may be found 
by estimating the social costs borne by different socioeconomic groups or 
income classes at different levels of education. 
A first point is how much the educational system is financed 
directly by the students and their parents and how much it is supported 
publicly. Of course, in any given country, the answer depends on the 
extent of private vis-a-vis public education and on the amount of sub-
sidization the government provides to each. A piece of evidence in this 
respect is presented in Table 21 for three Eastern African countries: 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. Some of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from these data are: 
(1) In the three countries large proportions (90 percent or more) 
of the expenditures on education are directed to the public 
educational systems. 
(2) The public educational systems are financed mainly by the government. 
In Ethiopia and Kenya public financing by the national government 
provides 70 percent of the total resources of the system. In the 
case of Tanzania the corresponding figure exceeds 90 percent. 
(3) Household resources supply a relatively small proportion of the 
financing of public educational systems. Household resources 
are most important in Kenya, where they make up 17 percent of 
the financing of public education; in Ethiopia and Tanzania they 
provide only 1 percent of the total. 
(4) Private educational systems are financed predominantly or 
exclusively by households' direct contributions. The respec-
tive proportions are 50 percent in Ethiopia, 90 percent in Kenya, 
and 100 percent in Tanzania. In all cases public financing of 
private educational systems is negligible. 
(5) From (1) and (4) above, since most educational resources in 
these countries are spent on public education and since public 
education is funded predominantly by public financing, it follows 
that public taxes are the main source of educational finance in 
these countries. 
Table 21 
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EDUCATION 
BY SOURCES OF FUNDS, THREE EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Ethiopia 1970-71 
( m i l l i o n s Ethiopian d o l l a r s 
Publ ic Pr iva te 
Kenya 1970-71 
(mi l l i ons Kenyan pounds) 
Publ ic Pr iva te 
Tanzania 1970-71 
( m i l l i o n s Tanzanian s h i l l i n g s ) 
Publ ic P r i v a t e 
Sources of 
f inanc ing 
National 
resources 
Publ ic 
f inanc ing 
Household 
resources 
Other pr iva 
resources 
Foreign 
Resources 
External 
Loan? 
External 
a s s i s t a n c e 
Tota l 
educat ional 
system 
93 .2 
91 .7 
1 .3 
t e 
0 . 2 
31 .4 
4 . 0 
27 .4 
1 2 4 . 5 
Source; t e r Weele (1975) 
educat iona l 
system 
8 .9 
0 .4 
8 .2 
0 .3 
7.7 
0 .0 
7.7 
1 6 . 6 
Tables 2 - 8 , 
Tota l 
102 .1 
9 2 . 1 
9 .5 
0 .6 
3 9 . 0 
4 .0 
35.0 
141 .1 
3 - 9 , 4-
% 
72.4 
6 5 . 1 
6.7 
0 .4 
27 .6 
2 .8 
24.8 
100 .0 
-9. 
educat iona l 
system 
37 .9 
30 .0 
7 .1 
0 .8 
Ail 
0 .1 
4 .6 
4 2 . 4 
educat iona l 
system 
5 .8 
0 .0 
5 .5 
0 .3 
0 .3 
0 . 0 
0 .3 
6 .1 
Total 
43.7 
30 .0 
12 .7 
1 .0 
5 .0 
0 . 1 
4 .9 
48.7 
% 
89.7 
61 .6 
26 .1 
2 .0 
1 0 . 3 
0 .2 
1 0 . 1 
100 .0 
educat ional 
system 
548 .3 
541.8 
6 . 1 
0 .4 
1 5 . 6 
2 .2 
13 .4 
563.9 
educat iona l 
system 
1 6 . 8 
0 .0 
16 .8 
0 .0 
0 . 0 
0 .0 
0 .0 
1 6 . 8 
Tota l 
565.1 
541.8 
22 .9 
0 .4 
1 5 . 6 
2 .2 
1 3 . 4 
580 .7 
% 
9 7 . 3 
93 .3 
3 .9 
0 . 1 
2 .7 
0 .4 
2 .3 
1 0 0 . 0 
00 
1 
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These conclusions hold qual i ta t ive ly for most developing countries. 
This being the case, i t i s important to determine who pays the taxes and who 
pays the fees that finance the pr ivate educational systems. 
Studies of the incidence of taxes in developing countries have 
been synthesized in a review paper by de Wulf (1975), to which the interested 
reader i s referred. I t i s beyond the scope of th is paper to analyze in 
de ta i l the methodology underlying the conclusions obtained. For our purposes 
i t wi l l suffice to extract the main conclusions, which are based on forty-four 
studies covering twenty-two less developed countries: 
For twelve of these s tudies , owing to the i r specific approach 
or the i r limited coverage, no general impression of suggested rate 
progression could be obtained. Of the remaining thirty-two studies, 
twenty-two suggested some progressivity in the effective tax rate 
schedule. This progressivity pattern was often an uneven one and 
frequently did not extend up to the highest income or expenditure 
brackets or s ta r ted only from the second or third income class . 
The degree of progressivity of the tax ra tes also varied from steep 
(however defined) to moderate. The resu l t s of eight other studies 
could be characterized as suggesting some wandering proportionality 
in the r a t e pa t te rn . These countries are mainly in Latin America... 
The taxes of only two countries (Greece and the Philippines) could 
be characterized as regressive. 
The general impression le f t by the studies surveyed here is 
that the tax system in developing countries tends to burden the 
incomes of rich families re la t ive ly more than the incomes of poor. 
These studies are not without the i r l imi ta t ions , as de Wulf himself points 
out. Despite the tenta t ive nature of thei r r e su l t s , however, i t is fa i r to 
conclude that the higher income groups pay more absolutely, and an equal or 
higher proportion of the i r incomes re l a t ive ly , to finance school costs as 
compared with the lower income groups. 
A second issue is whose children attend pr ivate schools. A detailed 
study of Colombia by Jal lade (1974) (see Table 22) clearly shows that , at a l l 
levels of education, those families in the higher income brackets are more 
apt to enrol l the i r children in pr ivate schools. For example, in the top 20 
percent of the families (annual incomes 60,000 pesos or more) 50-90 percent of 
the children at primary and secondary levels are in pr ivate schools, whereas 
in the lower 60 percent of the families (annual incomes less than 36,000 
pesos) the comparable figure never exceeds 20 percent and is much lower in 
most cases. Moreover, if we consider that school fees vary widely from one 
pr ivate school to another and that families from the highest income brackets 
tend to send the i r children to the most expensive schools, we may infer that 
the d is t r ibut ion of fee payments in pr ivate schools i s much more concentrated 
at the top of the income scale than the enrollment rates show. 
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Table 22: 
DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT IN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE SCHOOLS BY FAMILY INCOME LEVEL, URBAN COLOMBIA 
(in Percentages) 
nnual ir icome bracket 
(pesos) 
0-
6,000-
i2,000-
18,000-
J4.000-
}0,000-
16,000-
t8,000-
i0,000-
2,000-
4,000-
10,000-
0,000-
*r 
6,000 
12,000 
18,000 
24,000 
30,000 
36,000 
48,000 
60,000 
72,000 
84,000 
120,000 
180,000 
240,000 
240,000 
tal Enrollment 
Number 
(thousands) 
Primary 
Public 
95.0 
90.0 
85.0 
89.1 
89.1 
89.5 
64.8 
54.6 
42.5 
34.5 
22.4 
20.3 
11.9 
12.0 
72.5 
1,316 
Private 
5.0 
10.0 
15.0 
10.9 
10.9 
10.5 
35.2 
45.4 
57.5 
65.5 
77.6 
79.7 
88.1 
88.0 
27.5 
500 
Educational level 
Secondary 
Public 
95.0 
90.0 
85.0 
79.9 
81.0 
81.0 
58.9 
49.7 
38.7 
31.3 
20.3 
18.4 
11.1 
11.0 
49.0 
341 
Private 
5.0 
10.0 
15.0 
20.1 
19.0 
19.0 
41.1 
50.3 
61.3 
68.7 
79.7 
81.6 
88.9 
89.0 
51.0 
355 
High* 
Public 
— 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
95.0 
90.0 
85.7 
86.3 
67.1 
54.3 
35.2 
32.0 
19.2 
19.3 
54.8 
46 
ar 
Private 
— 
— 
— 
— 
5.0 
10.0 
14.3 
13.7 
32.9 
45.7 
64.8 
68.0 
80.8 
80.7 
45.2 
38 
rce: Jallade (1974, Table 3.11). 
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To sum up, the evidence presented thus far shows that the financi 
of the educational systems in less developed countries is borne more than 
proportionally by the higher income groups. This is for two reasons. 
Public Education. Public educational systems are heavily subsidiz 
by governments. Thus, who bears the financing of public education depends 
mainly on the tax s t ruc ture , which in turn seems to be proportional or even 
progressive to some degree in most less developed countries. 
Private Education. Private educational systems draw students 
disproportionately from the upper income groups. Because pr ivate educationa 
systems are in general financed through direct fees paid by the students (o 
the i r parents) , and because the children of the higher-income families tend 
enrol l more frequently in pr ivate schools, i t follows that the higher-income; 
groups pay a disproportionately large share of the costs of pr ivate educati 
The above conclusions per ta in only to the incidence of the direct 
costs of financing the educational systems. There ex is t , however, oppor-
tunity costs borne by the students, or the i r parents, that are also relevan 
These opportunity costs consist of the income the students could earn if th 
were working instead of being enrolled in schools. The r icher families beari 
a more than proportional share of these opportunity costs , since a dispropo# 
t ionate number of students are from richer families because of the higher 
enrollment rates among the well- to-do. This i s strengthened by the fact 
that opportunity costs increase with the level of education, and disparities 
among enrollment rates tend to be greatest at higher educational levels. 
We may therefore conclude that both direct and indirect costs 
of education in developing countries are borne more than proportionally 
by upper-income families. 
B. Distr ibution of Costs and Benefits of Education 
In th i s par t , the question under investigation i s : how do the 
costs of education borne by parents in various income groups compare with 
the benefits received by the i r children? This requires us to compute the 
d i s t r ibu t ion of costs according to paren ts ' income, the d is t r ibut ion of 
benefits according to paren ts ' income, and then to compare the two. The 
studies reported below share th is methodology. 
The studies di f fer , however, in what specif ical ly i s included 
under costs and benef i ts . Some view the educational system primarily as a 
f i sca l program that grants subsidies (benefits) to pupils and pays for these 
subsidies (costs) out of current tax revenues. Others also consider addi-
t iona l costs and benefits — in par t i cu la r , future income gains and oppor-
tunity costs that come from attending school. The inclusion of these other 
items in the comparison leads to a more comprehensive research approach. 
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The remainder of this section reviews studies of the distribution 
of educational costs and benefits in three countries: Kenya (Fields 1975b), 
Colombia (Jallade 1974), and Chile (Foxley et al. 1976, 1977a, 1977b). 1/ 
1. In Kenya 
My study of the higher educational system in Kenya (Fields 1975b) 
was done at the same time as Jallade's work on Colombia (see the next subsec-
tion). Some methodological differences bear highlighting. I attempted to 
estimate broadly the social costs and benefits of education received by 
different income classes, where Jallade (and most authors after him) have 
limited attention to public sector subsidies and taxes. Because of data 
limitations, however, my work was restricted to higher education, whereas 
Jallade and others have been able to study primary and secondary education 
also. 
Table 23 presents the estimated values of direct costs and benefits 
of investing in the three levels of higher education in Kenya (primary and 
secondary teacher training colleges, and university). Earnings data were 
based on public service salary scales. The system is fully subsidized, so no 
direct private costs need be imputed. The remaining cost items consist of the 
implicit subsidy given by the government (rows 1 and 4) and the direct oppor-
tunity costs borne by the students. Both figures are large relative to family 
income. Forgone earnings are at least Shs. 9,000 annually (the entrance 
salary for public service), which corresponds to the top 2 percent of the dis-
tribution of income (see Table 24). Still, these costs are small when com-
pared with the benefits of attaining a high educational level. The additional 
income obtained by those who continue their education after secondary school 
is so large that it yields a rate of return of about 30 percent annually. 
Thus, higher education in Kenya is a lucrative investment that yields large 
benefits and places an individual at the very top of the income distribution. 2/ 
\j Two other studies dealing with the comparison of costs and benefits 
of education across income groups are not reviewed here. One of them 
is Jallade's (1977) work on Brazil. His study has a fundamental methodo-
logical problem: conclusions about different benefits for different 
groups are based on the individual's own household's characteristics, 
rather than those of his parents' household. The second study is that 
by Szal (19 79) on rural Botswana. This work has not been included 
because of doubts regarding the quality of the underlying data expressed 
by those in the World Bank familiar with it. Two studies dealing with 
the distribution of benefits (subsidies) from education have been published 
recently: Selowsky (1979b) for Colombia and Meerman (1979) for Malaysia. 
Neither addressed the distribution of the costs of education, therefore 
they are not included here. Finally, all the studies that are presented 
below deal only with the redistributive effect of the financing of 
public educational systems. I am not aware of any study that tries to 
assess the costs and benefits accruing to different income groups whose 
children are enrolled in the private educational systems. 
2/ Benefits here are defined as the net present value of attaining the 
higher educational level — that is, present value of increased income 
less direct costs (only forgone earnings in the case of Kenya). 
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Table 23; 
COSTS, BENEFITS, AND PRIVATE RETURNS TO DIFFERENT 
EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN KENYA, 1971 
(Kenya Shillings) 
Educational attainment 
Item 
Primary 
TTCs 
3,140 
0 
18,160 
6,280 
Secondary 
TTCs 
5,600 
0 
27,600 
16,800 
University! 
of Nairoblj 
17,740 1 
0 | 
47,100 | 
55,600 1 
a/ 
Average annual social cost — 
Direct private cost 
Total forgone earnings (undiscounted) 
Total direct subsidy after Form 4 — 
Present value of private benefits compared 
cl 
with Form 4: -
r - 0% 
r = 5% 
r - 10% 
Private internal rate of return over Form 4 
(percent) 
302,820 
99,852 
37,626 
549,660 
192,184 
82,882 
771,880 
277,182 
120,818 
28 33 31 
Note: One Kenya shilling = US$0.14 in 1971; TTC - teacher training college. 
Soutce; Fields (1975b, Table II). 
a/ Average annual social cost • (recurrent expenditures + amortization of current 
development expenditures + depreciation on existing capital stock) f number of 
pupils. 
b_/ Form 4 is the last level of secondary school. 
c/ For the details on the calculations, see the source. 
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Who receives the benefits and who pays the taxes? The relevant 
data are given in Table 24. Columns 2 and 3 show the d is t r ibut ion of t ax-
payers and of taxes by income c lass . Columns 4, 5, and 6 present the d i s -
t r ibut ion of students at the three levels of higher education by the i r parents ' 
income c lass . Because at each level of education the direct costs and benefits 
are the same for a l l s tudents, the l a s t three columns also represent the d i s -
t r ibut ion of benefits by income c lass . 
These data can be evaluated with three different c r i t e r i a : 
Equal Opportunity. By th is c r i t e r ion the system i s equitable if 
each income group has access to higher education equal to i t s proportion in 
the population. As Table 24 shows, th is condition i s not sa t i s f i ed ; the 
proportion of students coming from low-income families i s less than the 
proportion of low-income families in the t o t a l population. From th i s observa-
t ion i t may be concluded (Fields 1975b, p . 256) that " . . .Kenya's higher 
education is found to be inequitable intergenerat ional ly, since the few who 
are favored are disproportionately the children of the well- to-do, whether 
measured by income class , or various indices of socioeconomic s t a tu s " . 
Cost-Benefit. By th is c r i t e r ion , the system i s equitable if each 
group pays a proportion of the costs equal to the proportion of the benefits 
i t receives. On th i s def ini t ion, the system appears to be close to equitable, 
although there i s some tendency to favor middle-income groups as against 
the highest income groups. 
Ability to Pay. By th i s c r i t e r ion , the system i s equitable if 
the cost-benefit ra t io r i ses as a function of income. Comparing column (3) 
of Table 21 with columns (4) through (6), we find that the r iches t receive a 
much larger share of the benefits than the proportion they pay of the costs . 
The patterns for the other income classes, which contain the majority of 
families, are mixed. The approximate proportionali ty over those ranges 
might be regarded as inequitable if ab i l i ty to pay i s used as the standard. 
These somewhat contradictory conclusions suggest that the way in 
which the data are analyzed i s important in coming to qua l i t a t ive conclu-
sions about the equity of educational finance. Each of the preceding c r i -
t e r i a applies to the questions of ve r t i ca l equity — that i s , the fairness of 
different groups' contribution to the costs of education in re la t ion to the 
benefits received. A less ambiguous conclusion, which is equally relevant 
to other countries, pertains to horizontal equity (Fields 1975b, p . 257): 
". . .The main inequity in Kenya's higher educational system i s hor izontal . A 
select few receive a very large payoff and, if they were not re la t ive ly rich 
when they star ted the i r higher education, they wi l l be re la t ively rich when 
they complete i t . In other words, the system i s horizontally inequitable 
ex post though less so ex an te . " (Emphasis in the o r ig ina l . ) 
2. In Colombia 
For Colombia, Jallade (1974) took the subsidies received by students 
as the benefits of education and used the tax cost of these subsidies as a 
measure of the costs of education. His estimates of costs and benefits for 
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Table 24: 
INCIDENCE OF TAXES AND DISTRIBUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
BY INCOME OF STUDENTS' PARENTS, KENYA 1971 
(in percentages) 
Annual ] 
0 -
2 , 4 0 0 -
3 , 6 0 0 -
4 , 8 0 0 -
6 , 0 0 0 -
8 , 4 0 0 -
12 ,000-
16 ,800-
Over 
Total 
[ncome Bracket 
(Shs) 
(1) 
2 ,400 
3 ,600 
4 ,800 
6,000 
8,400 
12,000 
16,800 
24,000 
24,000 
D i s t r i b u t i o n 
of 
taxpayers 
(2) 
90 .5 
5 .4 
1.3 
0.7 
0 .5 
0 .5 
1 .1 
100 .0 
D i s t r i b u t i o n 
of 
taxes 
(3) 
67 .9 
8 .8 
2 .2 
1.4 
1.5 
2 .4 
15.7 
100.0 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of s tudents 
income c l a s s 
Primary 
TTCs 
(4) 
70.7 
3 .8 
6.2 
5 .6 
6.2 
1.9 
3 .4 l 
o.si 
1.4J 
100.0 
Secondary 
TTCs 
(5) 
74.7 
4 .0 
4 .9 
4 .4 
4.7 
1.8 
0 . 9 \ 
5 .6 2 . 2 \ 5 .5 
2.J 
100.0 
by parents] 
Universlt] 
of Nairobi 
( 6 ) ' 
60.2 
2.2 
2.2 
11.8 
11.8 
2.2 
9.6 
100.0 
Source: Fields (1975b, Table III, p. 252). 
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urban Colombia are presented in Table 25. l_/ Columns (2) and (3) show the 
proportion of taxes paid by the different income classes under two al ternat ive 
assumptions regarding tax incidence. The dis t r ibut ion of public subsidies by 
educational levels across income groups is presented in columns (4) through 
(7). Columns (8) and (9) measure, under two al ternat ive assumptions, the 
ra t io of public subsidies for education to that group's t o t a l tax burden. 
By the cr i te r ion of ab i l i ty to pay, the financing of Colombia's 
educational system appears to be highly progressive: the proportion of 
benefits received by the poor i s much higher than the i r share of the costs 
[as shown by the indices greater than 100 in columns (8) and (9) ] , and the 
ra t io of benefits to costs decreases steadily as income r i s e s . We may con-
clude from these observations that the system of educational finance in 
Colombia redis t r ibutes significant amounts of income from richer families 
to the poorer groups. 
A closer examination shows, however, that the redis t r ibut ive 
effects vary across educational leve ls . In Ja l lade ' s own words (1974): 
" . . . i t is clear that the posi t ive effect of the public financing of education in 
Colombia is only due to the financing of primary education which strongly 
benefits the poor. This posit ive effect is pa r t i a l ly but not wholly offset by 
the negative income-distributive effect of the public finance of secondary and 
higher education which benefits most of the lower and upper middle c lass , 
r e spec t ive ly . . . " (Emphasis in the o r ig ina l . ) 2/ 
When the c r i te r ion of equal opportunity is applied — that i s , the 
proportion of the overall benefits received by the poor i s compared with 
thei r share in the population ~ Ja l lade ' s data suggest that the poor share 
less than proportionately in the benefits of education. But th is conclusion 
has been challenged recently by Selowsky (1979b), who used data from Colombia 
for 1974, ordered households by the i r per capita income rather than the i r t o t a l 
income, and found that the dis t r ibut ion of benefits closely corresponds to the 
income dis t r ibut ion of households. A comparison of the resu l t s of both studies 
i s presented in Table 26. The discrepancy can be fully explained by the 
reordering of households from one income concept to the other. 3/ 
To sum up, the evidence for Colombia shows whether or not the 
financing of public education appears equitable depends on the cr i ter ion 
used to compare the costs and benefits received by the different income 
groups. 
1/ Jallade also reports resul t s for rural and a l l of Colombia but he 
expresses less confidence in the quality of the rural data. Because 
the general conclusions do not change qual i ta t ive ly , only the resul ts 
for urban areas are presented here. 
2/ The shares of the educational levels in t o t a l expenditures on public 
education were: 41.0 percent for primary, 31.4 percent for secondary, 
and 27.6 percent for higher. 
3/ Similar evidence on this point has been i l l u s t r a t ed by Datta and Meerman 
(1979), who used Malaysian data. I t is l ikely that th is discrepancy 
also characterizes the studies of Kenya and Chile presented in th is 
section. 
Table 25: 
URBAN COLOMBIA: ALLOCATION OF TAXES AND PUBLIC SUBSIDIES 
FOR EDUCATION AMONG INCOME GROUPS, 1970 
(In percentages) 
Distribution Allocation Allocation of public subsidies for education Subsidies received as 
Annual income of families of taxes proportion of taxes paid 
bracket 
0-
6,000-
12,000-
18,000-
24,000-
30,000-
36,000-
48,000-
60,000-
72,000-
84,000-
120,000-
180,000-
Over 
Total 
(pesos) 
6,000 
12,000 
18,000 
24,000 
30,000 
36,000 
48,000 
60,000 
72,000 
84,000 
120,000 
180,000 
240,000 
240,000 
(1) 
2.1 
12.6 
15.2 
15.1 
10.0 
7.5 
9.5 
7.3 
4.3 
3.6 
5.9 
3.7 
1.9 
1.3 
100.0 
Alt.l 
(2) 
0.2 
1.5 
3.6 
5.3 
4.5 
4.4 
7.7 
6.7 
5.5 
5.0 
12.1 
11.4 
8.5 
23.5 
100.0 
Alt.l 
(3) 
0.1 
0.9 
2.4 
3.5 
3.1 
3.0 
5.4 
4.6 
4.0 
3.6 
8.9 
14.8 
12.7 
33.0 
100.0 
Primary 
(4) 
3.3 
11.9 
17.0 
18.6 
14.8 
9.9 
9.6 
4.6 
3.1 
2.3 
2.0 
1.6 
0.6 
0.6 
100.0 
Secondary 
(5) 
1.7 
1.7 
6.7 
15.1 
14.1 
9.9 
15.0 
11.9 
6.7 
4.8 
5.1 
3.9 
1.8 
1.6 
100.0 
Higher 
(6) 
-
1.0 
2.2 
5.4 
1.1 
6.8 
14.1 
18.6 
16.5 
6.6 
9.8 
11.1 
3.0 
3.8 
100.0 
Total 
(7) 
1.9 
5.7 
9.7 
13.9 
10.8 
9.0 
12.5 
10.8 
7.9 
4.3 
5.1 
4.9 
1.6 
1.8 
100.0 
Alt.l 
(8) 
309 
119 
84 
81 
74 
63 
50 
50 
45 
26 
13 
13 
6 
2 
31 
Alt. 
(9) 
507 
182 
121 
117 
105 
90 
69 
69 
58 
36 
17 
10 
4 
2 
30 
Source: Jallade (1974, Tables 3.15 and 3.17). 
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Table 26 
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES FOR EDUCATION 
BY HOUSEHOLDS' INCOME AND PER CAPITA INCOME, COLOMBIA 
Household li 
(thousands of 
0- 6 
6-12 
12-24 
24-60 
over 60 
Tota l 
acome 
pesos) 
J a l l a d e , 
D i s t r i b u t i o n 
of households 
(%) 
19.0 
20.2 
24.9 
22.9 
13.0 
100.0 
1970 
D i s t r i b u t i o n 
of subs id i e s 
(%) 
5.9 
9.5 
23.7 
38.7 
22.2 
100.0 
Selowsky, 
Quin t i l e s of 
househo lds ' 
per c a p i t a 
income 
Lowes t 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Highest 
1974 
D i s t r i b u t i o n 
of subs id ies 
(%) 
19.8 
20.2 
18.6 
20.1 
21.3 -
100.0 
Source; Selowsky (1979b, Table 3.20) 
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3. In Chile 
A study of fiscal incidence in Chile may also be used to compare 
various groups' educational costs and benefits. Foxley, Aninat, and Arellano 
(1976, 1977a, 1977b) derived data by income class on the distribution of 
fiscal expenditure on education along with taxes (see Table 27). These 
authors used basically the same methodology as Jallade. Benefits were eval-
uated at the cost of government subsidies and were assigned to the enrolled 
students, whose distribution by parents' income class was known. 
By the criterion of ability to pay, the educational financing 
in Chile appears to be highly equitable: as column (8) of Table 27 shows, 
the cost-benefit ratio increases steadily as income rises. However, we 
also observe that the proportion of benefits accruing to the lower 60 per-
cent of the households is smaller than these households' share in the popu-
lation, which means that the equal opportunity criterion is not met and the 
educational system is regressive by that measure. 
When the data are disaggregated by educational level, it appears 
that the bulk of the benefits reaching the lower-income groups accrues 
through the subsidization of primary schooling. 1/ Moreover, at higher 
educational levels, a larger fraction of the benefits accrue to middle-
and higher-income groups. This reflects the fact that the children of 
the poor participate relatively less in the higher levels of education. 
C. Conclusions on Educational Finance and Income Distribution 
In summary, we may draw the following conclusions from these studies 
of Kenya, Colombia, and Chile: 
o Public educational systems are heavily subsidized by governments. 
Thus, who supplies the financing of public education depends mainly 
on the tax structure, which in turn seems to be proportional, or 
even progressive, to some degree in most developing countries. 
o Private educational systems draw students disproportionately from 
the upper income groups. Because private educational systems are, 
in general, financed through direct fees paid by the students (or 
their parents), and the children of the higher income families tend 
to enroll more frequently in private schools, it follows that the 
higher income groups pay a disproportionately large share of the 
costs of private education. 
o The distribution of the benefits from education in developing 
countries appears to be highly inequitable by the criterion of equal 
opportunity. That is, in all cases in which households are ordered 
by their total income, the proportion of benefits accruing to 
1/ The shares of the educational levels in total public educational expendi-
tures were: 36.3 percent for primary, 18.4 percent for secondary, 27.2 
percent for university, and 18.1 percent for other expenditures. 
Table 27: 
CHILE: DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 
IN EDUCATION BY INCOME CLASS, 1969 
Household 
annual income 
(in minimum 
annual income 
units) 
0 - 1 
1 - 2 
2 - 3 
3 - 4 
4 - 5 
5 - 6 
6-8 
8-10 
10 or more 
Total 
Distribution 
of households 
(1) 
Sources: Columns 
29.8 
31.6 
17.6 
7.4 
4.5 
2.9 
2.7 
1.5 
2.0 
100.0 
(1) and (2): 
Distribution 
of direct and 
indirect tax 
burdens 
(2) 
7.6 
18.1 
17.3 
9.6 
7.7 
7.0 
7.8 
6.5 
18.2 
100.0 
Foxley, Aninat, 
Primary 
(3) 
19.5 
38.4 
23.6 
10.4 
3.5 
1.2 
1.3 
0.6 
1.5 . 
100.0 
Secondary 
(4) 
11.1 
31.0 
29.0 
12.3 
5.6 
2.0 
3.8 
1.5 
3.7 
100.0 
and Arellano (1977a, 
University 
(5) 
6.2 
27.8 
16.1 
13.8 
7.3 
4.0 
6.4 
1.9 
16.5 
100.0 
Table 13); 
Other 
educational / 
a/ 
expenditures— Total 
(6) (7) 
21.4 
36.1 
22.0 
9.9 
3.8 
1.4 
1.9 
0.7 
2.8 
100.0 
14.7 
33.8 
22.3 
11.6 
5.0 
2.1 
3,2 
1.1 
6.2 
100,0 
Cost-beeefit 
ratio, total 
(7)/(2) 
i§2 
Columns (3) through (7): Foxley, Aninat, and Arellano (1977b, Table 14). 
a/ Includes expenditures on technical and vocational training, provision of free lunch for 
primary students, other programs of financial assistance, and expenditures on school 
buildings. 
.52 
.54 
.78 
.83 
1.54 
3.33 
2.44 
5.91 
2.94 
i 
ho 
VO 
vo 
I 
-300-
students from the lower income groups is much smaller than the share 
of lower income groups in the population. In Colombia, however, 
when households are ordered by their per capita income, the system 
appears broadly equitable by the equal opportunity criterion. 
o Although the poor participate less in the benefits of education, 
they also bear a lower proportion of the costs. 
o On balance, the costs of education rise with income faster than 
do the benefits of education. Thus the cost-benefit ratios are 
higher for the richer groups in the countries examined, and hence 
fiscal financing of public education appears to be effective in 
redistributing income from the rich to the poor. 
o This redistributive effect varies across educational levels. 
As the studies for Colombia and Chile show, most of the redis-
tribution toward the poor takes place through primary education; 
the financing of secondary and higher education tends to benefit 
disproportionately the middle- and higher-income classes. 
- 3 0 1 -
APPENDIX: 
CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN EDUCATIONAL PLANNING 
S o c i a l c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s i s o f t e n u s e d a s a c r i t e r i o n f o r 
s o c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n t h e f i e l d of e d u c a t i o n . T h i s i s done i n e i t h e r 
of two w a y s . One way i s t o e s t i m a t e t h e n e t p r e s e n t v a l u e of b e n e f i t s minus 
c o s t s u s i n g a n a p p r o p r i a t e s o c i a l d i s c o u n t r a t e . The s o c i a l v a l u e of e d u c a -
t i o n i s t h e n e s t i m a t e d a s t h e d o l l a r d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h e d i s c o u n t e d 
s t r e a m s of b e n e f i t s and c o s t s . I f t h i s number i s p o s i t i v e , t h e i n v e s t m e n t 
i s s a i d t o be p r o f i t a b l e ; i f n e g a t i v e , n o t p r o f i t a b l e . The o t h e r way of 
c o n d u c t i n g s o c i a l c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s i s t o f i n d t h a t i n t e r n a l r a t e of 
r e t u r n which e q u a t e s t h e p r e s e n t v a l u e s of b e n e f i t s and c o s t s . With t h i s 
method, t h e s o c i a l v a l u e of e d u c a t i o n i s e s t i m a t e d a s a p e r c e n t a g e r a t e of 
r e t u r n p e r d o l l a r i n v e s t e d . T h i s i s t h e n compared w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e on 
t h e b e s t a l t e r n a t i v e i n v e s t m e n t . 
We e c o n o m i s t s p o s e t h e r i g h t q u e s t i o n when we a s k what a d d i t i o n a l 
b e n e f i t s w i l l r e s u l t f o r a g i v e n e x t r a e x p e n d i t u r e of f u n d s . But t h e e c o -
nomics of e d u c a t i o n h a s d i f f i c u l t y i n t r a n s l a t i n g t h i s g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e 
i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l l y mean ing fu l t e r m s . To e v a l u a t e t h e s o c i a l c o s t - b e n e f i t 
s t u d i e s , s e v e r a l i s s u e s a r i s e . Are most i f n o t a l l of t h e s o c i a l c o s t s and 
b e n e f i t s enumera ted? Are t h e s e b e n e f i t s and c o s t s e v a l u a t e d c o r r e c t l y ? What 
i s t h e p r o p e r s o c i a l i n t e r e s t r a t e t o be u s e d f o r compar i son? 
I n a c t u a l p r a c t i c e , t h e g e n e r a l c o s t - b e n e f i t p r i n c i p l e ( t h a t s o c i e t y 
s h o u l d a l l o c a t e r e s o u r c e s t o t h a t a c t i v i t y w i t h t h e l a r g e s t m a r g i n a l s o c i a l 
b e n e f i t p e r d o l l a r expended) i s u s u a l l y compromised, o f t e n s e v e r e l y . The 
r e s u l t , t o o f r e q u e n t l y , i s n e g l e c t or m i s e v a l u a t i o n of t h e most i m p o r t a n t 
c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of e d u c a t i o n . On o c c a s i o n , t h e s e s t u d i e s a r e w o r s e 
t h a n u s e l e s s : they may be downr igh t m i s l e a d i n g . My r e a s o n s f o r t h i s c r i t i c a l 
a s s e s s m e n t a r e e x p l a i n e d i n what f o l l o w s . 
I have two p r i n c i p a l w o r r i e s . One i s t h a t s t a n d a r d r a t e of r e t u r n 
s t u d i e s a r e on ly i n d i r e c t l y l i n k e d t o deve lopment o b j e c t i v e s such as p o v e r t y 
a l l e v i a t i o n o r i n e q u a l i t y r e d u c t i o n . My o t h e r c o n c e r n i s t h a t t h e b e n e f i t s of 
e d u c a t i o n may be s e r i o u s l y m i s e s t i m a t e d by e s t a b l i s h e d p r o c e d u r e s . 
Be fo re p a s s i n g judgment on t h e c o s t s and b e n e f i t s a c t u a l l y i n c l u d e d 
i n s o c i a l r e t u r n t o e d u c a t i o n s t u d i e s , we must be c l e a r on p r e v a i l i n g p r a c -
t i c e s . I n a c t u a l s t u d i e s , on t h e c o s t s i d e , s o c i a l c o s t s i n c l u d e t h e d i r e c t 
c o s t s of e d u c a t i o n ( t e a c h e r s ' s a l a r i e s , a m o r t i z a t i o n of s c h o o l b u i l d i n g s , 
books and s u p p l i e s , e t c ) p l u s t h e i n d i r e c t o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t of income f o r e -
gone w h i l e s t u d e n t s a r e i n s c h o o l ( app rox ima ted by t h e income e a r n e d by a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e l a b o r f o r c e who had n o t comple ted t h a t 
s c h o o l i n g l e v e l ) . On t h e b e n e f i t s i d e , t h e s o c i a l g a i n from e d u c a t i o n i s 
t a k e n as t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n income be tween i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h and w i t h o u t t h e 
e d u c a t i o n l e v e l i n q u e s t i o n . Somet imes , t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l i s m u l t i p l i e d by a 
more or l e s s a r b i t r a r y p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y f a c t o r d e s i g n e d t o a d j u s t f o r s e l e c t i o n 
and s e l f - s e l e c t i o n of s t u d e n t s a c c o r d i n g t o a b i l i t y . 
NOTE; T h i s a p p e n d i x i s r e p r i n t e d from F i e l d s ( 1 9 7 8 b ) . 
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After itemizing factors which are taken into account in social 
return to education studies, it should be clear that much is missing. When 
education is considered as an indicator of progress and commitment toward 
development, much weight is given to the participation of the poor in educa-
tion. In contrast, conventional social rate of return studies ignore who the 
beneficiaries of education are and who pays the costs. Without this kind of 
information, it is impossible to weigh the contribution of education to 
development as compared with, say, public health programs or rural electri-
fication. The success of an antipoverty or pro-equality program cannot be 
judged by comparing aggregate costs with aggregate benefits alone. 
It is also evident that many of the presumed noneconomic benefits 
of education are not dealt with. Most economists would not worry too 
much about this. They would say that the economic benefits are fairly well 
enumerated and evaluated. Thus, most economists would regard conventional 
social rate of return estimates as a reasonable approximation to the economic 
returns to social investments in education; but since noneconomic returns 
are neglected, they would consider the true social return to education to be 
greater. Hence, if social rates of return are calculated in the usual way 
and are found to be high, their presumption is that investment in education 
is worthwhile, both economically and socially. On the other hand, if the 
estimated social rates of return are found to be low, educational programs 
must be justified on some other, noneconomic grounds. It is in this way that 
virtually all education economists use social rates of return estimates for 
policy evaluation and planning. 
I disagree with accepted practice on this. While incomplete 
enumeration of social benefits may lead to an underestimate of the actual 
returns to education, my concern is that the usual way of evaluating social 
benefits is improper and leads to an overestimate of the economic returns, 
conceived of as the gains in output produced by a more educated labor force. 
To see why the accepted evaluation procedure may be unjustified and misleading 
in a less developed country context, we must look carefully at the way social 
benefits to education are evaluated in the standard literature. 
Customarily, the benefits of education are found by comparing 
income profiles of persons with and without a particular level of education 
(for simplicity, termed "educated" and "uneducated" respectively). These 
profiles may look like this: 
Wage 
"Educated" 
"Uneducated" 
Time 
Time in 
schoel 
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This diagram depicts profiles for the average individual. Rates of return 
based on such profiles are therefore average rates. 
As always in economics, for policy purposes, the interest is in 
the marginal expenditure, in this case, the marginal dollar spent on educa-
tion or the marginal individual who receives that education. That is to say, 
the question for social decision-making in the education field is this: if 
society invests $X in more education, what is the extra benefit? 
The conventional assumption maintained in the literature is that 
the marginal and average benefits from education are approximately equal, 
as are the marginal and average costs. On the cost side, this assumption 
poses little problem. On the benefit side, the assumption of equal marginal 
and average benefits is correct if the labor market works in the standard 
textbook fashion, i.e., wages and employment are both determined by supply 
and demand: 
Labor market for Labor market for 
"educated" workers "uneducated" workers 
Educating an additional person shifts the supply of educated labor by one 
unit to the right and shifts the supply of uneducated labor by one unit 
to the left. The newly-educated worker is employed at the educated worker's 
wage (We(j)> which is only slightly different from the wage received pre-
viously by other educated workers. Likewise, the wage for uneducated workers 
changes slightly, but only by a small amount. Under the maintained assump-
tions of the textbook model—that the demand for labor reflects the marginal 
revenue product of labor and that the labor market is in full competitive 
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equilibrium—the average wage differential between educated and uneducated 
workers then approximates the gain in social output due to the education 
of an additional worker. 
Now, I contend that the textbook model does violence to the actual 
workings of labor markets in many less developed countries. Often, these 
countries are characterized by a surplus of educated labor (surplus in 
the sense that more educated persons are available for work at the prevailing 
wage than are demanded at that wage). Graphically, the situation looks like 
this: 
Case 11: 
Alternative 
model 
uned 
Labor market for 
"educated" workers 
Labor market for 
"uneducated" workers 
=MRP . 
uned uned 
uned 
Unl ike t h e compe t i t i ve model where both employment and t h e wage a r e determined 
by supply and demand i n t h e l a b o r market , I th ink i t i s more r e a l i s t i c t o view 
t h e causa l o r d e r i n g as f o l l o w s : 
( i ) t he wage i s determined above t h e m a r k e t - c l e a r i n g 
l e v e l by some combinat ion of i n s t i t u t i o n a l and 
market f o r c e s ; 
( i i ) f i rms de te rmine employment i n t h e textbook way by 
h i r i n g u n t i l t h e marginal revenue product of l a b o r 
equa l s t he wage; and 
( i i i ) t h e supply of l abo r i s a f u n c t i o n of both t h e wage 
r e c e i v e d wh i l e working and t h e volume of employment. 
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Suppose now that one more person i s educated. If the labor surplus 
s i tua t ion holds, the newly-educated individual enters the educated labor 
market (shift of the supply curve from S to S ' ) . But unlike the textbook 
case, he w i l l not be employed, since the wage does not f a l l to accomodate him. 
No new output is gained. The marginal social benefit in economic terms is 
zero. On the other hand, output i s foregone (approximately MRPuned) and 
rea l resources are used to educate him. The marginal socia l return (marginal 
social benefits of education minus marginal social costs) i s negative, at 
l eas t in familiar output terms. 
A numerical example may help i l l u s t r a t e these points . Consider a 
simple case of two types of labor (skil led and unskil led) and two occupations: 
clerks (the ski l led occupation) and gardeners (the unskilled occupation). 
Wages for the two occupations are taken as given. Assume that education is 
required for a job as a clerk and i s preferred for a job as a gardener. This 
means that in a labor surplus s i tua t ion , the educated workers compete amongst 
one another for jobs as clerks, but any educated person who seeks a job as a 
gardener i s hired preferent ia l ly at the gardeners' wage. 
Suppose the s t a t e of the economy i s : 
Wage of clerks (dollars per day) 
Employment of clerks 
Supply of clerks 
Wage of gardeners (dollars per day) 
Total employment of gardeners 
Supply of educated gardeners 
Employment of uneducated gardeners 
Supply of uneducated gardeners 
$20 
50 
100 
$10 
40 
25 
15 
75 
The question i s whether addit ional investment in education i s prof i table . 
I t would appear from these data that the answer i s yes. Educated workers 
employed as clerks receive twice the wage of uneducated workers employed 
as gardeners, and educated workers have three times the probabil i ty of 
being employed at a l l . I t might be presumed, therefore, that educational 
investment i s worthwhile for socie ty . But s t i l l , we should carry through 
the appropriate calculat ions . 
To compute pr ivate and social ra tes of return to education, (ignor-
ing s t i l l who receives the benefits and who pays the costs) we need three 
additional pieces of information: a projection of future labor market condi-
tions to gauge the pr ivate benefi ts , a measure of the educated-uneducated 
productivity d i f ferent ia l to gauge the social benefi ts , and knowledge of the 
costs of education. 
Concerning the future s t a t e of the labor market, le t us make the 
simplest possible assumption: that current labor demand conditions ( i . e . , 
number of workers demanded in each occupation and the wage paid in each) wi l l 
remain the same forever. This implies: 
( i ) The current expected income di f ferent ia l between 
educated and uneducated workers ($8 per day = 
$2,000 per year) i s expected to prevai l through-
out the individual 's working l i f e . 
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On the cost s ide , le t us assume: 
( i i ) I t takes one period to educate a person; and 
( i i i ) The pr ivate cost of being educated (out-of-
pocket cost plus foregone earnings) i s $1,000. 
Equating the present value of pr ivate benefits with the present 
value of pr ivate costs , the pr ivate ra te of return is given implici t ly by 
1 1 1 
2,000 + 2 + . . . + T = 1,000, 
1 + r (1 + r ) (1 + r ) 
where T is the relevant time horizon, presumably retirement. For suffi-
ciently large T, the left hand side is approximately 2,000/r. We then 
find that the private rate of return to educational investment is 200 per-
cent. It would be an understatement to say that education would be a 
very lucrative personal investment. 
Consider now the social rate of return as conventionally computed. 
To compute the conventional social rate of return, we also need data on the 
social cost of education. To reflect the realistic condition that education 
in LDCs is typically highly-subsidized, assume: 
(iv) The social cost of educating one person is $10,000. 
The conventional social rate of return is given implicitly by 
1 1 1 
2,000 + 2 + ... + _T = 10,000, 
1 + r (1 + r) (1 + r) 
and is found to be 20 percent. By the customary calculations, educational 
investment would appear desirable, provided the return on other alternative 
investments were lower, say 10 percent. Some might even say that this 
hypothetical country is not fully committed to education, since it is fore-
going a seemingly advantageous social investment. 
The problem with the inferences of the previous paragraph is that 
they are based on average rather than marginal calculations. The marginal 
social rate of return is that internal rate which equates the marginal 
social benefits to the marginal social costs. This rate may be large, 
small, zero, or negative, depending on the size of the productivity gains 
resulting from education. Nothing in the data we have so far tells us 
which is the case (unless, that is, we make the assumption that an additional 
newly educated individual would be employed at the skilled wage; this assump-
tion is inconsistent with the spirit of the labor surplus model under inves-
tigation). 
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The proper guide for assessing the economic costs and benefits 
of educational investment i s the marginal socia l r a t e of re turn. To compute 
i t , we need some assumption about the productivity of educated workers 
re la t ive *• •> uneducated ones in the unskilled occupation, since that i s where 
the newly educated individual w i l l be employed. 1_/ Suppose in our examples 
(v) An educated gardener i s 2 percent more productive 
than an uneducated one. 
The marginal social benefit i s 2 percent of the gardener's wage, 
2% x $10/day x 250 days/yr. = $50/yr. The marginal social r a t e of return 
is given implici t ly by 
1 1 1 
50 + 2 + . . . + T = 10,000, 
1 + r (1 + r ) (1 + r ) 
the solution of which yields a marginal social rate of return of one-half of 
one percent. 2/ Despite the earlier findings that the average private and 
social rates of return are very high (200 percent and 20 percent respecti-
vely), we would probably all agree from this final calculation that educa-
tional investment would be undesirable, at least in a strict economic sense. 
I would conclude from this theoretical exploration that the usual 
types of estimates of social rates of return to education in less developed 
countries are unreliable and possibly grossly misleading. 
At least one real-world study supports this theoretical skepticism. 
I am familiar with only one empirical cost-benefit study of education 
which calculates a marginal social rate of return. In a study of Greece, 
Psacharopoulos (1970) constructed a linear programming model with different 
skill grades of labor and estimated the shadow wage rates for each. For 
our purposes, the most interesting conclusion is: "in the case of Greece, 
investment priorities with respect to investment in skills estimated on 
the basis of observed labour earnings would have suggested a change in the 
wrong direction of the educational output." (Emphasis added.) 
Lest the critique of this appendix be misinterpreted, let me 
reiterate: the logic of social cost-benefit analysis in education is 
sound. Social cost-benefit analysis asks the right questions. It must 
do a better job of answering them. 
1/ The reason he will be employed in the unskilled occupation is to maintain 
supply side equilibrium. The educated workers' labor market is in supply 
side equilibrium only when the expected wages are equal in the two alter-
native occupations, which they are in the hypothetical data. If a 
newly educated worker enters the skilled occupation (clerk), his presence 
there would depress the expected wage for clerks below the expected wage 
for educated gardeners; he (or someone like him) could gain by taking up 
employment as a gardener. 
27 It is mathematically impossible for the internal rate of return to be 
negative if T, the time horizon, is allowed to approach infinity in the 
limit. 
jMMimiaiiii 
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